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CHAPTER 1 
Implementing Government Reforms:         
Science of Delivery Case Studies 
 
By 
 Jaeun Shin, Taejong Kim, and Junesoo Lee 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This report is a compilation of four case studies based on the science of 
delivery (SoD) perspective. More specifically, these case studies utilized the 
Global Delivery Initiative (GDI) framework to illustrate how the SoD 
perspective identified impediments to development in the implementation of 
programs and projects, as well as documenting innovations that helped 
overcome these obstacles in an integrated manner. The GDI framework 
allowed this using a detailed taxonomy of delivery challenges. The case studies 
presented in this volume cover a diverse range of regions and sectors: 
improvement of health care delivery in Ghana, reduction and management of 
disaster risk in the Philippines, boosting customer service in the railways of 
India, and enhancing public security in Ecuador. Regardless of the differences 
in regional as well as sectoral contexts, a large swath of development 
impediments is remarkably found in the realm of implementation, and such 
challenges in delivery identified in the studies could be resolved by 
strengthening what is called “collaborative accountability.” Problems in public 
policy arise due to failure of the market and citizenship. The case studies 
presented in the report suggest that the government or the public sector could 
successfully take on public policy challenges when it enlists the help of the 
people and corporations involved, so that they can better help themselves. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the possible implications of the SoD 
perspective for possible sharing of development knowledge, including through 
the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) of Korea Development Institute (KDI). 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Science of Delivery (SoD) Perspective and Global 
Delivery Initiative (GDI) Methodology 
 
Over the years international cooperation was implemented to achieve 
development goals, a vast amount of technical knowledge on effective 
solutions to problems has been accumulated. Yet the effectiveness of 
each solution to a shared problem, such as providing clean water, is 
subject to country-specific contexts. To resolve this issue, the World 
Bank’s Global Delivery Initiative (GDI) has created a knowledge 
sharing framework called “the science of delivery (SoD).” 
 
The GDI is a global consortium geared to enhance the effectiveness 
of cooperation in international development from the SoD perspective. 
With more than 30 institutional members like the World Bank and KDI, 
the consortium has developed the taxonomy of delivery challenges, or 
“non-technical” barriers for the implementation of development projects 
and programs. The texts of more than 5,000 project completion reports 
were analyzed to identify the most common types of implementation 
problems in development projects; interactions with project task team 
leaders followed to seek their feedback. By repeating this process, the 
consortium came up with a list of 52 common delivery challenges 
classified into 15 groups (see Attachment for Delivery Challenge 
Taxonomy). 
 
The SoD concept is to allow development practitioners to use a 
common set of specific markers to facilitate the discussion of related 
strategies. The SoD case studies provide detailed narratives on a 
development challenge, the initial intervention, delivery challenges, and 
strategies to ultimately achieve targeted indicators for a development 
goal. Their aim is to devise practical lessons for practitioners working 
on national or international development projects and programs. 
 
“The Global Delivery Initiative is a collaborative effort to create a 
collective and cumulative evidence base of delivery knowhow to inform 
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development practice and improve implementation. The GDI and its 
partners support practitioners on the ground to adapt to dynamic contexts 
and solve stubborn delivery challenges.”1  
 
1.2. About This Report 
 
This report is a compilation of four country case studies from the SoD 
perspective; the case studies presented in this report’s main body report take 
advantage of the SoD methodology developed by the GDI. The purpose of 
this report is to illustrate how the SoD perspective, and more specifically 
GDI methodology, can be utilized to document impediments to 
development and successful interventions to overcome them. For this goal, 
KDI School’s faculty researchers taught an experimental flipped-learning 
course in the summer term of 2017 called “Government Reform: Science of 
Delivery Case Writing Practicum.” Fourteen students enrolled in the six-
week course and took a step-by-step process to develop field study 
proposals. Considering the quality of the submitted proposals as well as 
regional representation, the faculty researchers selected four of the 
proposals and worked with their student authors. The four case studies 
submitted in the main body of this report are the fruit of this collaboration.  
 
The case studies cover a diverse range of regions and sectors: 
improvement of health care delivery in Ghana, reduction and management 
of disaster risk in the Philippines, boosting customer service in the railways 
of India, and enhancing public security in Ecuador. Summarizing the 
analyses, <Table 1> presents the SoD taxonomy together with an 
illustration of what delivery challenges were identified in the four case 
studies, in addition to which of the areas intervention was implemented in 
to overcome delivery challenges.  
 
Regardless of the differences in regional as well as sectoral contexts, a 
large swath of development impediments was remarkably found in the 
                                            
1 Quoted from http://www.globaldeliveryinitiative.org/about-us.  
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realm of implementation, and the delivery challenges identified in the 
studies were resolved by strengthening what is called collaborative 
accountability. In short, public policy problems arise due to failure of the 
market and citizenship. The country case studies suggest that the 
government or public sector can take on and overcome public policy 
challenges when it enlists the help of the people and corporations involved, 
so that they can better help themselves. 
 
▌Table 1-1 ▌ Delivery Challenge Taxonomy & Its Application to 
Compiled Case Studies 
Clusters & categories Countries & cases 
Ghana Philip-pines India Ecuador 
E-claims 
system for 
health 
services 
Commu
nity-
based 
disaster 
relief & 
mgmt. 
Social 
media-
based 
train 
passenger 
service 
Criminal 
justice 
& 
crime-
preventi
on 
Stakeholder     
 Coordination & engagement 
Roles & responsibilities  I   C,I C, I C,I 
Stakeholder engagement C, I C,I I C,I 
Awareness & 
communication strategy C C,I  C,I 
Bureaucratic structure C, I C,I  C,I 
Inter & intra-gov’t 
relations I C,I C C,I 
Commitment & 
leadership 
Change in leadership & 
administration   I C,I 
Opposition or lack of 
consensus    C,I 
Change in priorities or 
lack of commitment   C, I  
Human 
resources & 
organizational 
capacity 
Skilled personnel C C C, I C,I 
Skilled transfer     
Staff turnover     
Organizational capacity C C C, I C,I 
Context     
 
Legislation & 
regulations 
Lack of regulation & 
legislation  C  C,I 
Unsupportive legal & 
regulatory process     
Governance & 
politics 
Voice & accountability  C,I C C,I 
Corruption & patronage     
Political interference     
Electoral cycles     
Rule of law    C 
Conflict & Crime & violence    C 
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instability Civil unrest & armed 
conflict     
Post-conflict situation     
Society & 
culture 
Gender     
Language     
Culture, religion & 
ethnicity     
Environment & 
geography 
Geographic access  C   
Ecosystem  C   
Basic 
infrastructure 
Information & 
communication technology C C I C,I 
Energy & electricity  C   
Transportation  C   
Disasters & 
emergency 
response 
Natural disasters  C   
Man-made disasters     
Epidemics     
Biz environment Private sector regulation     
Weak private sector I    
Informal & illegal 
markets     
Macroeconomic 
environment 
Trade barriers     
Financial instability     
Market deterioration     
Forex volatility     
Project     
 Project design Overly ambitious objectives     
Time allocation or task 
sequencing   C  
Stakeholder selection     
Beneficiary targeting   C  
Project finance Procurement     
Financing mechanism     
Budgeting   I  
Financial management 
& reporting     
Auditing     
Project data & 
monitoring 
Indicators   C, I  
Data availability & 
baselines   I  
Reporting & supervision     I  
Note. C: Challenge; I: Intervention 
 
The remainder of this opening chapter of the report will proceed as 
follows. Section II is the digest of each case study. Section III presents an 
integrated analysis of the findings according to the SoD perspective and the 
concept of collaborative accountability. Section IV concludes the report by 
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suggesting the adoption of the GDI framework for operation of the 
Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) conducted by KDI’s Center for 
International Development (CID) as well as the think tank’s capacity-
building programs. 
 
 
2. Case Studies: Ghana, Philippines, India and Ecuador 
 
This chapter summarizes SoD case studies on Ghana, the Philippines, 
India, and Ecuador. Each case explores specific sectoral challenges for 
development: claims processing reform in Ghana (health care), disaster 
management in the Philippines, railway service improvement in India, and 
reform of crime prevention administration in Ecuador.  
 
2.1. Electronic Claims System of Ghana’s NHIS – Jaeun Shin 
 
The electronic claims (e-claims) system is a widely commended 
strategy to enhance the efficiency of payment management ensuring 
quality service delivery from provider to patient. Implementation of 
such a system, however, is plagued with obstacles such as lack of 
infrastructure, namely internet connectivity, power supply, and personal 
computer equipment at service sites, as well as limited technical 
capacity of medical personnel and management of institutions.  
 
2.1.1. Implementation of E-claims System in Ghana 
 
[Development Challenge]  
 
Ghana is the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to introduce 
universal coverage of health insurance, launching its National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2002. A leading problem in NHIS program 
operations was claims management. The paper-based claims system was 
ineffective, with processing centers disintegrated, few errors in claims 
detected, and mismanagement of claim processing resulting in payment 
delays. This resulted in a resource deficiency among providers that 
jeopardized service delivery to people in need. Recognizing that failure 
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of the claim management process undermined the NHIS’s overall 
function, the Ghanaian government and the NHIS took initiatives to 
implement the integrated e-claims system in 2013.  
 
[Intervention] 
 
The first step toward a more efficient system of claims management 
was the setup of the centralized claims processing center (CPC) in Accra 
in 2010. This center was a pilot site in which a consolidated claims 
management system was installed. Three more CPCs were opened in 
Kumasi, Cape Coast, and Tamale as 155 centers were merged into four 
zonal centers by 2012.  
 
The institutional reform to integrate governance of fragmented claim 
processing, however, merely resolved inefficiency in claims processing 
on a partial basis. At CPCs, claims submission, review, and payment 
were administered with paper documents. Each CPC received and 
stored an enormous volume of paper claims from all health facilities in 
its region of jurisdiction. Clinical staff found it infeasible to effectively 
review claims, making fraudulent billing, duplication and/or markdown 
in reimbursement, and delayed claim payment commonplace.    
 
With multiple CPCs in operation, the standardization of the process 
also proved critical given the varying levels of knowledge of health care 
administration and medicine by IT and medical professionals, in 
addition to the adoption of various data formats to claims processing. In 
2012, the NHIS initiated the digitization of data entry and assessment of 
claims, a process that required the standardization of data format, data 
entry platform, and medical terminology and coding. The NHIS also 
published health data dictionaries as core manuals for e-claims 
personnel.   
 
[Delivery Challenges and Strategies] 
 
Stakeholder engagement Though the institutional structure of the 
claims process was reformed into a centralized network of regional 
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centers tasked with standardized procedures, service providers saw no 
value from this new claims management system. They initially resisted 
adoption of the e-claims system given the costs of equipment 
installation and training for technical adaptation. In April 2013, a pilot 
program for unifying a direct e-claims platform was launched by 
inviting 47 health care facilities. Such facilities received support from 
the NHIS and the World Bank Health Insurance Project (HIP) in the 
form of technical and human resources and financing to ensure the 
required operational capacity for e-claims submission. Health facilities 
soon benefited from the e-claims system through faster reimbursement 
and accreditation as well as the committed support of the nation’s top 
health agencies, the Ministry of Health and the NHIS. Skilled personnel 
The NHIS and HIP provide human resource assistance under a “holding 
hands” approach to health care facilities and staff. A team of IT 
professionals makes occasional visits to facilities across the country to 
provide technical support and training for the e-claims system as well as 
the latter’s promotion.  
 
Information and communications technology The NHIS took an 
innovative approach toward supporting health care facilities with 
inadequate infrastructure in that providers arranged a credit facility for 
IT companies providing IT equipment. Under this unique arrangement, 
providers participated in the e-claims system and secured funding for 
buying IT equipment through effective and fast reimbursement.  
 
In the pilot program, the NHIS’s support and mandates spurred 
service providers to adopt the e-claims system, and this eventually led to 
the national introduction of the e-claims system in November 2013.    
 
The process of e-claims implementation was instituted by the NHIS, 
which closely collaborated with the Ministry of Health, Ghana Health 
Service (GHS), and HIP. Such public support empowered the NHIS 
leadership and secured the e-claims system’s sustainability, as effective 
claims processing ultimately benefited all citizens with quality care and 
service delivery readiness by providers.   
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The case study of Ghana’s e-claims system illustrates how a country 
can achieve health care reform by tackling multifaceted challenges: 
institutional fragmentation, mismanaged procedural logistics, lack of IT 
infrastructure and skilled personnel, and limited engagement by major 
stakeholders.   
 
2.1.2. E-government in Developing Countries: Uruguay, Zambia, Brazil, 
and China 
 
In many developing economies, the adoption of information and 
communication technology (ICT) is a crucial strategy to raise 
government efficiency and improve access to essential public services. 
Yet policy goals and target outcomes, as well as implementation 
processes and strategies, widely vary per a country’s context.  
 
Common delivery challenges associated with implementing e-
government services are lack of physical (e.g., internet connectivity and IT 
equipment) and human resource capacity (e.g., ICT skills of service 
providers and users) and stakeholders’ limited awareness of the benefits of 
online government services.  
 
The World Bank’s Global Delivery Initiative (GDI) conducted case 
studies on the delivery of e-government services in three developing 
countries: Uruguay, Zambia, and Brazil. The three offer informative 
comparisons to the case of Ghana. 
  
In Uruguay, the first step toward improving digital connectivity was the 
formation of the National Committee for Information Society for planning 
and the Agency for Electronic Government and Information Society 
(AGESIC) for implementation (Sabatino, 2017). AGESIC trains elementary 
school teachers, provides free laptop PCs to school-age children, and free 
home internet plans for low-income households. These efforts helped 
improve infrastructure readiness and digital literacy of the general public.   
 
AGESIC operates small offices in urban areas called citizen service 
points (PACs), where in-person training and free wireless internet 
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service are provided for citizens to access online government services. 
Simple user-friendly websites and alternative phone lines allow the most 
digitally disadvantaged population to procure government services 
online such as vehicle registration, fee payment, approval of new 
businesses, and filing e-complaints to police. 
 
The case study of Uruguay shares key success factors with Ghana’s 
e-claims system. First, a centralized institution directed, managed, and 
coordinated all processes and stakeholders. Infrastructure was provided 
free of charge or heavily subsidized. And regional service centers, free 
access to online government services, and in-person training were 
provided to users and core personnel.  
 
In Zambia, e-government service was implemented to ensure 
efficient and secure transmission of DNA test results for early diagnosis 
of HIV-infected infants. The secure and timely transfer of DNA samples 
and test results was threatened due to distance, unreliable transportation, 
and fragmented logistics across facilities and health workers.  
 
Project Mwana, the government initiative implemented by the 
Zambian Ministry of Health, offers an institutional platform to 
coordinate financial and technical support from the U.N. Children’s 
Fund’s (UNICEF) Innovation Team, the Clinton Health Access Initiative, 
and the Zambia Prevention, Care and Treatment Partnership.  
 
The hardware for the e-transfer of test results is a mobile phone-
based SMS system. Free apps are developed to handle the collection of 
information, coordination, and communication among mothers, regional 
health facilities, and delivery of the national health care service. 
Training and visits by health care workers are provided by the Zambian 
Ministry of Health to secure the digital literacy of frontline service 
providers, resulting in the expansion of Project Mwana (Gallucio, 2017). 
 
Similar to the case of Ghana, Zambia’s adoption of e-service focused 
on health care. The scope of ICT’s adoption in service delivery was 
narrowly defined as the transfer of information between the central 
 
     
 CHAPTER 1 Implementing Government Reforms: Science of Delivery Case Studies       11 
agency and regional providers through a simple system of mobile short 
message service (SMS). This highly available mobile tool allowed 
mothers to stay better informed of recommended treatments and 
encouraged use of services. The case study of Zambia shows that a 
mobile phone-based platform is cost efficient and helpful in the 
improvement of service quality and access, and also assists endpoint 
users with limited ICT capacity. M-Pesa, for example, is a proven e-
platform for personal banking, fee collection (such as utilities and 
pension contributions), and cash transfers for low-income households. 
 
In Brazil, an electronic invoice program in Rio de Janeiro called 
Nota Carioca is another example of an e-government service targeting 
the invoicing and collection of service tax through ICT. The program 
had been used by other municipalities in Brazil, and Rio decided to use 
the model to streamline its tax management. To raise awareness among 
and attract the participation of the business community, Nota Carioca 
offered cash rewards as incentives to customers who submit invoices 
digitally (Fowler, 2015). 
 
China offers another case study featuring an e-claims system in a 
developing economy (Liang et al, 2004). The country’s health care 
system is hampered by inefficient resource allocation, unreliable service 
delivery, and managerial ineptness in dealing with rapidly rising health 
care costs, partly due to a decentralized administrative framework.   
 
The Chinese Ministry of Health has initiated major reform through the 
China Golden Health Medical Network Project, which has set up a satellite-
transmitted national health care communications network. The crux of this 
project is the Golden Health Card, a smart card with an embedded chip to 
save a patient’s information. Hospitals began utilizing an electronic data 
interchange (EDI) system to communicate with other providers, medical 
resource suppliers, insurers, and banks. This system, however, is not free 
from fiscal and human resource limitations. Legal and physical 
infrastructure to set up the EDI system is available only in large cities or 
industrialized regions. The decentralized governance of the health care 
system undermines the functional capacity of the central government to 
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expand the EDI system, whereas in Ghana, the plan for institutional reform, 
standardization of the process, and collaboration with internal and external 
stakeholders facilitated the adoption of the e-claims system in the African 
country’s centralized system of national health insurance.  
 
2.1.3. E-claims System in Korea 
 
Korea drafted its e-claims system in 1979, when legal, institutional, and 
strategic planning to that end were initiated (Korea EximBank, 2016; Kim, 
2010; Kim, 2006; Yoo, Kim & Choi, 2000; Park, 1995; Lee, 1998; Song & 
Lee, 2003). In 1989, the health insurance was expanded to cover virtually 
all citizens, leading to drastic growth of claims. All submitted claims were 
paper based, delivered by postal mail, and manually processed. Claims sent 
by regular mail took about 10 days to reach the designated processing office.  
 
In 1994, a primitive e-claims system based on diskettes was adopted 
after a pilot program was conducted. The diskette-based system of 
claims processing was developed by the efforts of Korea’s Health 
Insurance Review and Assessment (HIRA) Service, and the country 
achieved another milestone with the standardization of data coding. 
Adoption of this system, however, depended on the voluntary 
participation of health facilities, leading to a fundamental limitation in 
achieving national efficiency in claims management.   
 
In December 2016, the EDI system underwent trial service at 100 
hospitals and clinics in Seoul. Developed by Korea Telecom (KT), the 
system had been adopted earlier by private companies such as POSCO 
from the mid-1990s. KT offered to form a partnership with the National 
Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) for the development of EDI 
system applications, expecting large revenue from network usage fees in 
return.  
 
In 2000, the claims management function was transferred and 
centralized into HIRA upon the latter’s spinoff from the Korean health 
insurance agency. HIRA engineered the EDI system’s expansion and 
service upgrade such as 24-hour operation of the central monitoring 
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system, revision of the claim format for ease of use, and improvement 
of the data warehouse (DW) for storage and processing of the vast 
volume of e-claims data. In 2009, another technical upgrade was 
achieved as Korea went from the EDI system to a web-based one; this 
resulted in a large reduction of the network fees paid to KT by health 
care facilities.   
 
In 2005, Korea’s e-claim processing rate exceeded 99 percent. The 
claims process was also sped up from 40 days using the paper-based 
method to just 15 under the EDI standard. The NHIS utilized more 
transparent processes, accurate reviews, and lower processing costs to 
fiscally enable a reduction of claims. The EDI system also improved 
protection of patient information by encoding all personal data. 
 
The success of the Korean e-claims system, however, did not come 
without delivery problems. Two key obstacles were standardization of 
the e-format and getting providers to adopt the new claims system. 
Providers had to bear all costs of the EDI system’s adoption, including 
payment of the EDI service fee to KT, and their access to the EDI 
database was regulated. The NHIS also struggled to provide the 15-day 
reimbursement for EDI-submitted claims due to the massive inflow of 
e-claims. Training IT staff to run the EDI system and new review 
standards were also prerequisites for the e-claims system. The recent 
adoption of the web-based e-claims system was thanks to persistent 
strategic efforts to resolve the aforementioned delivery challenges.  
 
2.1.4. Lessons from Ghana’s Science of Delivery Case Study 
 
Many high-income countries such as the U.S., Singapore, and 
Canada have adopted the e-claims system but did so in the 1980s, when 
their GDPs and other socioeconomic indicators greatly surpassed those 
of developing countries like Ghana. Korea offers another precedent in 
which the e-claims system for health care was rather a sectoral 
extension of the preexisting and verified e-processing system in 
operation for government services and businesses.  
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Korea has numerous documents and reports that detail the 
implementation of e-government and/or e-claims. Most of the available 
documents, however, focus on a chronological description of processes, 
emphasize the legal, institutional, and political aspects, and describe the 
outcomes. Policy lessons are inclined to focus on the strengths of the 
Korean experience.  
 
From the science of delivery (SoD) perspective, each country’s 
successes and failures are subject to context. Failure of the process 
should be examined through the window of delivery challenges. Thus 
Ghana’s experience in the e-claims system could provide practical 
lessons for countries at a similar development stage with parallel 
delivery challenges. 
 
▌ Figure 1-1 ▌  Framework of E-Government System’s Implementation 
 
 
[Figure 1-1] describes the framework of e-claims implementation 
drawn from the case study of Ghana, highlighting the major delivery 
challenges and strategies for each obstacle other countries could use as 
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reference. [Figure 1-2] specifically demonstrates the core element of the 
implementation of Ghana’s e-claims system. A central government 
agency assumed full responsibility for planning, funding, stakeholder 
engagement, support for hardware and software, and capacity building. 
Citizens and businesses under the influence of a newly adopted e-
government system are often given incentives to participate. The 
expansion of a new system to the national level greatly benefits from a 
well-planned, monitored, and evaluated pilot program. The central 
government or agency in charge should procure financial and technical 
support from other public institutions and international organizations. 
Promotion of the e-government system to the intended beneficiaries, 
namely the general public, is essential for securing political feasibility to 
complete the implementation process and thus ensure success. 
 
▌Figure 1-2 ▌ Framework of Ghana’s Implementation of E-claim System 
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Offering universal health coverage can be a herculean task for many 
developing countries. Ghana’s e-claims system shows that an effective 
claims process can provide a clue to get all stakeholders to take part in a 
national health insurance system: patients receive service, providers get 
paid, and the insurance provider enjoys strong public support and thus 
sound collection of premiums to secure the system’s long-term financial 
feasibility. A top-down approach engineered by strong government 
commitment should be conjoined to community awareness and 
empowerment for policy sustainability and system diffusion. The 
success of the e-claims system and similar reforms will depend on 
whether the public and stakeholders fully comprehend its strategic 
importance. 
 
Delivery challenges drawn from the Ghana case study are 
summarized below as a checklist for e-government service:  
 
(Institutions) 
• Whether institutional accountability is clearly defined and properly 
authorized to plan, lead, and manage the implementation process 
• If financial and technical support is available from multinational 
agencies, international organizations, or other governmental and/or 
non-governmental initiatives  
 
(Infrastructure and Skilled Personnel)  
• Whether key stakeholders have adequate IT infrastructure 
- Power supply and internet connectivity: phone line, wireless, or 
mobile 
- Computers, mobile devices, or offline web portal 
• If key stakeholders are properly trained to operate or use e-
government system  
- Civil servants, business owners, or citizens  
- Regional service center, in-person visit, or partnership with 
private sector 
• Whether e-government service is standardized, simple, and easy 
to use (software)  
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(Stakeholder engagement) 
• Whether incentives are necessary to engage key stakeholders  
- Accreditation, prioritized process, approval, and payment 
- Cash rewards, fee waiver or discount, award of appreciation 
• If benefit of e-government service is tangible enough to earn 
public support 
 
2.2. Reduction and Management of Community-based Disaster 
Risks in the Philippines – Taejong Kim 
 
In 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (called Yolanda in the Philippines) 
devastated much of the central Philippines, inflicting heavy casualties 
and property damage in its wake. The town of San Francisco in Cebu 
Province, however, miraculously survived the disaster without a single 
casualty thanks to close-knit coordination by the town government and 
communities. This enabled timely evacuation of residents in vulnerable 
areas to designated safety points. Such a positive outcome is never 
guaranteed even if disaster signals are shared in advance with residents 
in the areas to be affected, as fear of property loss could hinder 
evacuation efforts by public authorities without close coordination and 
mutual trust among community members. 
 
Close coordination and building mutual trust at the community level 
are far from easy in any setting. This is especially true in the Philippines, 
where the administrative unit closest to a local community is quite large. 
Such a unit in the Philippines is the barangay; in San Francisco, a 
barangay encompasses about 5,000 residents. Similar conditions prevail 
in large swathes of the developing world.  
 
The San Francisco government took on the challenge by investing in the 
purok system. One purok is a residential community with one barangay 
typically covering seven to ten puroks. From 2003, San Francisco organized 
purok leaderships and empowered them with smaller projects that delivered 
immediate and tangible outcomes for their residents. Unique for a region in the 
central Philippines, San Francisco was ready to implement directives from the 
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National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act featuring genuine 
coordination with residential communities.  
 
This case study illustrates that engagement and empowerment of 
communities are essential for the delivery of services requiring close 
coordination with such communities, and that community organization is 
possible even if the capacity of a regional government is stretched. 
 
2.3. Indian Railways’ Civic Engagement Mechanism for Enhancing 
Customer Service and Responsiveness – Junesoo Lee  
 
2.3.1. Social Media-based Customer Service in Indian Railways 
 
[Developmental Challenge and Initial Intervention]  
 
Indian Railways (IR) has shown how to achieve “collaborative 
accountability” between government and citizens. To deal with the diverse 
demands of its numerous passengers, IR sought to include the people in the 
management process. Using a social media channel (Twitter) as a form of 
communication allowed general passengers to report problems in service and 
thus contribute to the betterment of IR service. This insightful and proactive 
intervention, however, did not stop complications from arising. As the new 
service was unprecedented, many expected and unexpected problems arose 
in the process of implementation. 
 
[Delivery Challenges and Adaptation]  
 
Phase 1: Institutional implementation of proactive intervention 
To begin with, IR had to deal with the enormous volume of tweets 
that greatly exceeded the company’s internal response capacity. IR staff 
in charge of social media operations had neither the experience nor 
system to deal with the huge demand for external services. In the end, 
the company’s support for its social media-based service was rapidly 
boosted and its organizational structure and process underwent 
institutionalization. Computer professionals joined the company’s new 
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team-based operations and a new working process was designed and 
streamlined. 
 
Phase 2: Expanded institutionalization of external services 
Once IR completed its institutional efforts, new challenges arose. 
Not only did the number of passenger requests skyrocket, but the 
diversity of such requests was hard to trace and manage systematically. 
This prompted the company to expand its institutionalization of social 
media by adopting more seamless, decentralized, outsourced, and 
further standardized Twitter operations. 
 
Phase 3: Smart institutionalization of internal coordination 
The expansion of institutional features had one more internal 
problem to overcome: conflicting roles of IR staff. Both the diversity of 
passenger demands made via social media and the large number of IR 
staff in charge of social media operations resulted in an incredibly 
excessive load of assigning and closing tweets. The confusing, 
overlapping, and never-ending tasks overwhelmed IR staff. So the 
answer was a new tool for customer relations management (CRM) that 
helped categorize tweets by urgency and trace each tweet’s start and end. 
This technological breakthrough not only raised the efficiency of work 
but also systematically evaluated service performance. 
 
Summary of IR reform:  
The IR case study vividly shows how public services can be planned 
and delivered through collaborative accountability between public 
organizations and the general public. The process of intervention and 
adaptive learning in this case study has four dimensions: IR’s attempt to 
better serve passengers was processed (1) from a provider-driven 
perspective to a customer-driven one; (2) from top-down planning to 
that from bottom to top; (3) from external strategic challenges to 
internal operational ones; and (4) from a focus on implementation to one 
on evaluation. 
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2.3.2. Comparative Review and Implications for SoD 
 
The policy domain of this case study is basically public 
transportation. Previous cases of public transportation in the Global 
Delivery Initiative mostly pertain to “hardware” of the design or 
construction of physical infrastructure for public transportation. The 
uniqueness of the IR case lies with two facts: (1) IR’s higher priority on 
the “software” of passenger services and (2) the resolution of the 
software problem through civic engagement. 
 
This novel approach to public service offers new implications to the 
SoD framework. The core question for reconsideration is “who is 
responsible for public problems or services?” One possible answer 
might be government. Continued adoption of this kind of provider-
oriented philosophy will result in government being overwhelmed by 
the ever-growing burden of public problems. When people say 
“government should solve public problems under a citizens-oriented 
approach,” government will face a double burden to be more responsive 
to the people. Considering the limited capacity of the government and 
public organizations, the global decline of trust in government could 
partly stem from the growing burden placed on government. 
 
The IR case study implies that a collaboration-oriented approach 
needs more light. Responsibility for society needs to be shared by both 
government and citizens. The people might hold the original 
responsibility for resolving social problems because they are the ones 
causing most public problems. The reasons for growing public demand 
for government to resolve public problems are (1) failure of collective 
bargaining among citizens and (2) a mental tendency to pass 
responsibility to others (i.e., to government). The responsibility of 
citizens to take care of themselves needs to be returned to them. This 
can re-define the concept of government accountability. The IR case 
study shows how well citizens can help themselves. They identify and 
report railway problems themselves, and also prioritize passenger claims 
by categorizing their own. The people are taking care of themselves, 
while IR’s role is just to provide and operate a venue based on social 
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networking services (SNS) in which citizens participate, co-produce, 
and improve public services. In short, governments and public 
organizations might be accountable for helping fulfill civic 
accountability; this can be called “collaborative accountability.” 
 
2.4. Enhancing Criminal Justice and Administration of Crime 
Prevention in Ecuador – Taejong Kim 
 
Controlling violent crime is a major challenge in many parts of the 
developing world. Ecuador recently suffered from a worrisome hike in 
its violent crime rate, including that of homicide. Apart from the usual 
causes such as economic stagnation and weak government capacity for 
crime prevention, a conspicuous culprit was the transition of the 
country’s criminal justice system from the traditional accusatory model 
in Latin America, in which the judge doubles as a prosecutor, into a 
modern system with separate roles for the judge and the prosecutor. The 
hastily created prosecutors’ office in Ecuador, with little advanced 
training of new officials, added to the backlog of pending cases, 
hampering the criminal justice system and contributing to the worsening 
crime wave. Many countries in Latin America have undergone similar 
transitions, with many of them experiencing problems in the process of 
change.  
 
Ecuador, however, dramatically ended its crime wave, with the 
homicide rate, for instance, falling below the pre-crisis level. Several 
innovative measures contributed to the country’s remarkable turnaround. 
A common theme in the measures was the improvement of citizen 
outcomes, in this case, fewer victims of violent crime. Ecuador 
judiciously expanded the use of technology in the form of geo-
referencing of crime hotspots to better allocate crime prevention 
resources. Another element was the mobilization of the public in the 
emergency call service ECU911, as well as enhanced coordination 
among criminal justice and crime prevention agencies. Last but not least, 
streamlining procedures for handling pending criminal cases by 
prosecutors played a critical role in reducing the court backlog and thus 
raised the public perception of government efforts to fight crime.   
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3. Discussion: “Collaborative Accountability” in Diverse 
Contexts  
 
The four cases analyzed in this paper share both similarities and 
differences. To begin with, the differences are quite evident because 
each case represents a specific country and a diverse policy domain. 
Furthermore, different combinations of development and delivery 
challenges are shown. When it comes to the shared trait among the cases, 
all of them imply that public policy problems are (and should be) 
resolved through collaborative accountability. 
  
 Who is responsible for public policy problems? Who is in charge of 
policy intervention? Who is accountable to whom? Answering these 
questions could require not only empirical analysis of the problem-
solution logic model but also a fundamental rethinking of who is 
responsible for public policy problems. The major actors in society 
other than government are citizens and corporations who struggle with 
public problems and also provide solutions to them. Considering 
government’s core rationale of being expected to fill in the gaps of 
market and citizenship failure, the accountabilities of the three actors — 
government, citizens, and corporations — need to be revisited. In this 
vein, government’s accountability can be re-defined as the responsibility 
of the official entity in a country to help citizens and corporations fulfill 
their responsibilities. 
 
There are many arguments over the difference between the concepts 
of accountability and responsibility. In most cases, accountability 
implies a legal and legitimate reciprocity between principal and agent, 
while responsibility refers to a more cultural and normative relationship 
between them. But clearly drawing a line between the two concepts is 
difficult, and they are often interchangeable. In short, accountability or 
responsibility assumes the existence of two parties in which one expects 
the other to do something good or refrain from doing something bad. In 
the context of collaborative accountability, not only government but also 
citizens and corporations are expected to benefit other actors in society 
and are held accountable for doing so. 
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Returning to the four cases in this paper, the government or public 
corporations of each country have been carrying out, up to a point, their 
responsibilities to citizens and corporations in doing what is expected of 
them. In Ghana, the government helped hospitals to better serve patients 
and also efficiently file claims by launching and innovating the E-claims 
system. In the Philippines, the government of a provincial town helped 
residents trust each another and thereby cooperate in the face of a 
natural disaster by empowering and fostering communities. In India, a 
public corporation (Indian Railways) helped citizens monitor, report, 
and eventually improve public railway services by employing a 
revolutionary social media-based communication system. In Ecuador, 
the government helped citizens better report, check, and prevent crimes 
by reforming the judicial system and operations. 
 
Compared to societies plagued by constant adversity with no hope of 
resolution, actors in a sustainable society are more willing to jointly take 
on adversity as well as enjoy success in the community. They share both 
payoff and risks. In a nutshell, sustainable development is often a 
tangible result in a healthy society in which all actors embody shared 
responsibility or collaborative accountability. 
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▌Table 1-2 ▌ Collaborative Accountability in Four Cases 
Country  How did governments help citizens or corporations fulfill their 
accountability 
Civic or corporate 
accountability was 
helped by … 
Gov’t accountability 
Ghana To help hospitals better 
serve patients & file 
claims efficiently … 
Central gov’t (Ghana Health Service & 
Ministry of Health) & World Bank … 
• Centralized health data processing 
centers 
• Provided infrastructure in … 
o Software: standardization of 
health data dictionaries 
o Hardware: infrastructure 
support for service 
providers 
• Reinforced HR training for e-service 
center 
• Incentivized clients with early 
reimbursement & accreditation. 
Philippines To help citizens trust 
each other & thereby 
coordinate in event of 
natural disaster … 
San Francisco gov’t … 
• Invested in building purok system, or 
basic community unit 
• Organized purok leaderships 
• Empowered purok with small projects 
to deliver public services 
• Fostered coordination among 
residents. 
India To help citizens monitor, 
report, & eventually 
improve public railway 
service … 
Indian Railways … 
• Launched social media-based 
customer service 
• Kept strengthening HR hiring & 
operations 
• Decentralized & standardized Twitter 
operations 
• Categorized & assigned enormous 
number of tweets by urgency & other 
characteristics. 
Ecuador To help citizens better 
report, check & prevent 
crime … 
Ecuadorean gov’t … 
• Separated roles of judge & prosecutor 
• Adopted new technology to better 
locate crime hotspots 
• Improved emergency call service 
• Enhanced inter-agency coordination 
• Streamlined operating procedure for 
pending criminal cases 
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4. Conclusion: Science of Delivery, Collaborative 
Accountability, and Knowledge Sharing 
 
If the premise of the SoD perspective is taken seriously enough that 
obstacles to implementation account for a significant portion of 
impediments to development, the perspective and GDI methodology 
point to directions of possible improvement in the way KDI conducts 
consulting programs, including the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP). 
KSP policy dialogues mostly match sectoral experts from Korea with 
counterparts from partner countries. Korean sectoral experts might be 
highly knowledgeable on how specific programs and policies have been 
implemented in Korea, but environments can significantly differ abroad. 
In Korea, the public sector’s capacity is relatively high and government 
authority over the private sector is strong, yet this is often not the case in 
KSP partner countries. Ignoring these contextual differences could lead 
to shallow engagements with development partners and lower the 
effectiveness of knowledge sharing projects.  
 
Instead, the SoD perspective could play a supplementary role. One 
scenario is to augment the sectoral experts of a typical KSP team with 
“delivery experts,” or research staff at the Center for International 
Development trained in GDI methodology and framework. The 
augmented team then might engage their partners at a deeper level, not 
just sharing the Korean experience but also jointly mapping the 
expected delivery challenges and exploring strategies to resolve them. 
The GDI taxonomy of delivery challenges can facilitate such 
exploration. In addition, the GDI database should help compile the most 
likely delivery challenges for a partner country and the selected sector 
for KSP engagement. Relevant GDI case studies and toolkits can then 
be reprieved to aid the potential for secondary intervention to overcome 
delivery challenges. A combination of the Korean sectoral experience 
and the SoD perspective could be developed as the key modality of KSP 
engagement. In addition, the concept of collaborative accountability 
could emerge as the overarching theme of strategies to deal with various 
delivery challenges.  
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The combination of the Korean sectoral experience and the SoD 
perspective can also serve as a useful organizing framework for 
upgrading KDI’s capacity-building programs through the new pedagogy 
of blended learning. E-learning technologies promise a more cost-
effective and wider delivery of knowledge. The efficiency of such 
technologies can be enhanced when combined with face-to-face 
interactions between learners and facilitators that often feature 
pedagogic models of project-based learning (PBL) in a blended learning 
modality. The delivery of the Korean sectoral experience could be done 
through e-learning modules, like massive open online courses (MOOCs). 
This delivery can then be followed up by PBL-style face-to-face 
interactions focused on exploration of the Korean contexts of 
implementation and the mapping of likely delivery challenges in the 
eventual adoption of the Korean experience in a partner country, as well 
as the review of candidate coping mechanisms. The face-to-face 
interaction phase of capacity building can take advantage of the GDI 
database and the initiative’s assembled toolkit.  
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▌ Annexes ▌  
Annex A. Taxonomy of Delivery Challenges 
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CHAPTER 2 
How Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme 
(NHIS) Used the Electronic Claims Management 
System to Streamline and Boost Efficiency in Claims 
Management 
 
By 
Ubindam M. Jacob1 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
  
Executive Summary 
 
In 2010, Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) started 
the centralization of claims management across the country’s 145 
districts through the establishment of a claims processing center (CPC) 
in Accra; this was a step toward simpler claims submission and 
processing. Prior to this period, the NHIS had used a complicated and 
labor-intensive claims management process based on paper documents. 
This process faced a host of logistical challenges and transportation 
risks and was not cost effective. Widespread abuse of this system 
included cheating, over-invoicing, fraud, and unnecessary prescriptions 
                                            
1 Ubindam M. Jacob is a graduate student at the KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management. He holds a bachelor’s in psychology with a minor in political science 
from the University of Ghana and a graduate diploma in change management from 
the Maastricht School of Management in the Netherlands. He has more than 10 years 
of working experience in human resource management and administration. His career 
has spanned a diversity of domestic and international non-governmental organizations, 
public agencies, and the waste management industry in Ghana. Most recently, he 
worked with the Millennium Promise Alliance as the human resource coordinator for 
the SADA Millennium Villages Project in Ghana.   
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leading to financial losses for the NHIS. Such abuses of and errors in 
the system often caused delays in claims processing and payment. This 
often resulted in a stalemate between the NHIS and service providers 
and affected the effectiveness and efficiency of delivery of quality 
health care to subscribers. 
 
To tackle these logistical challenges in paper-based claims 
management, boost efficiency in claims processing, and ensure the 
transparency of service providers, the NHIS began reform efforts to 
centralize its claims management system by setting up the CPC in Accra. 
Initially, this center handled claims at regional and teaching hospitals in 
the Greater Accra region until 2012, when the leadership expanded the 
CPC concept to all zones through the opening of CPCs in Kumasi, Cape 
Coast, and Tamale. While the CPC in Accra handled claims from the 
Greater Accra, Eastern and Volta regions of Ghana, the Tamale CPC 
vetted and processed claims from service providers in the Northern, 
Upper East, and Upper West regions. The Cape Coast CPC did the same 
for claims from all service providers in the Central and Western regions, 
and the Kumasi CPC in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions. These 
CPCs, however, could not overcome the problems of claims 
management at Ghana’s NHIS, and what followed in their wake were 
challenges in the transcription of claims forms into digital format to 
enable data entry and analysis. Other problems occurred in 
standardization as service providers had different formats for the same 
data set. This led the NHIS to standardize health data by creating health 
data dictionaries to ease data entry, coding, and analysis. Though this 
initiative did inject efficiency in the claims management process to a 
degree, problems in the availability of IT equipment and keyboard skills 
of staff proved to stifle effective implementation. Moreover, trends 
identified in claims reports led the NHIS to ramp up clinical audits in 
2012 to reduce leaks to contain costs. To boost the efficiency of claims 
review and management, however, the electronic claims management 
system (e-claims system) saw pilot operations in April 2013 and 
national adoption in November 2013.  
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Despite the delivery problems encountered in technical, human 
resource, and financial matters, the NHIS effectively managed these 
challenges through evidence-based strategies. This enabled the NHIS to 
effectively use the e-claims system as a cost containment measure; the 
system enforced prescription and dispensing levels and linked treatment 
and diagnosis procedures. It also removed errors in claims processing 
and payment and minimized abuses of the system by detecting fraud. 
The e-claims system also provided information to the NHIS on the 
quality of health care provided and facilitated early payment of medical 
claims. In addition, it allowed the NHIS to extract credible claims data 
for analysis and overall policy direction. This case study is thus about 
the challenges of the NHIS’s claims management in Ghana, how the 
processes of the e-claims system from 2010-13 were developed, and 
how the system bolstered efficiency in claims review and 
reimbursement, leading to lower claims costs through the detection of 
errors, abuse, and fraud. These efforts were led by the NHIS with 
support from the Ministry of Health, Ghana Health Service (GHS), 
service providers, and the World Bank’s Health Insurance Project (HIP). 
This study draws on the lessons learned and best practices adopted from 
both the successes and failures of the implementation process. By 
identifying and analyzing delivery of this case, this study aims to 
contribute to related literature among practitioners and offer strategies 
employable in by similar situations. In presenting how the service 
delivery of this case study transpired and details of its outcomes, the 
following questions will be explored: 
 
• How were implementation capacity and the lead time for policy 
activities managed? How were human resource and logistical 
capacity managed? 
• How was the importance of stakeholder coordination identified 
and discussed? 
• How has the E-claims system impacted the quality of service 
delivered and sustainability of the NHIS? 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ghana became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to introduce 
universal coverage of health insurance for its citizens. Like many other 
lower- and middle-income developing countries, Ghana has undergone 
major changes over the years in health care financing since obtaining 
independence in 1957. A variety of financing models were adopted for 
health care,, but the most crucial development in the sector was the 
introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) through 
legislation (Act 650 of 2003, Amended Act 852 of 2012). The law aimed 
to replace “out-of-pocket fees” at the point of service delivery that 
prevailed over this period. The introduction of the NHIS was primarily 
to provide universal coverage, protection against financial risk, and 
wider access to quality health care to the Ghanaian people, especially 
the poor and vulnerable populations. By June 2009, health insurance 
coverage stood at 55 percent of the population from a combined 145 
district mutual health insurance schemes (DMHS). The active subscriber 
base reached 10.5 million as of December 2014 and more than 29 
million attendances were recorded at health care facilities thanks to the 
NHIS the same year. As one of the few attempts by a Sub-Saharan 
African country to implement universal health insurance, Ghana’s NHIS 
designed a provider payment system based on an itemized fee for 
service. In May 2008, however, diagnostic-related groupings and fees 
for services or medicine were introduced to replace itemized fee 
services following reform of the provider payment system. Through this 
new process, the NHIS devised a claims process that vetted all claims 
submitted by service providers “against provider eligibility, compliance 
with the Ghana diagnostic-related groups (G-DRGs), standard treatment 
guidelines and insurance drug list.” The claims were submitted by 
accredited public, private, and faith-based health care providers and 
facilities of the NHIS in the country’s ten administrative regions. Such 
providers included pharmacies, community diagnostic stations, health 
centers, and maternity homes. Others were clinics and district, regional, and 
teaching hospitals that served as national referral hospitals.  
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Evidence supports that the sustainability of a health insurance system 
largely depends on an effective and efficient claims management system 
that can detect errors, abuse, and fraud. The purchasing function of 
Ghana’s NHIS, however, suffered from delays in service provider 
payments due to claims errors and delayed claims processing. 
According to the 2008 report on review of the health sector, health care 
facilities in Ghana were owed unpaid claims while the service providers 
reported delays of two to six months in settling their bills. Meanwhile, 
the Legislative Instrument (LI 1809) of Ghana stipulates a 60-day 
period for service providers to submit claims and for NHIS managers to 
reimburse claims within 28 days after submission. Though studies on 
the processing of health insurance claims are limited in developing 
countries, research done in Gujarat, India, by Ranson and Sinha et al, in 
which a direct fee for service was operated among the Self-Employed 
Women's Association, found claims rejection rates of 11 percent and 10–
14 percent, respectively, with the former having a mean reimbursement 
rate of 76.5 percent. A 2002 survey conducted by the Health Insurance 
Association of America indicated that about 14 percent of reviewed 
claims from service providers were denied payment. In 2002 and 2006, 
similar methodologies adopted by the American Health Insurance Plan 
indicated a range of rejection rates for claims, with no record of rejected 
or denied claims in 2006. Instead, 14 percent of claims were “pending.” 
In Ghana, however, the rejection rate of claims submitted by service 
providers ranged from nine to 22 percent on a national scale as of 2008.  
 
This process of claims management was characterized by widespread 
abuses including cheating, over-invoicing, fraud, and unnecessary 
prescriptions leading to financial losses for the NHIS, thereby 
threatening its sustainability. In 2009 alone, moral hazard resulted in 
NHIS losses ranging from five to ten percent of claims cost. NHIS 
initiatives like centralized claims processing, clinical audits and linking 
diagnoses to treatment have effectively lowered the incidence of fraud 
and abuse, but more needs to be done. The high and increasing cost of 
claims also placed the NHIS under severe financial pressure and 
prevented the authority from reimbursing claims for services rendered to 
subscribers by NHIS providers on time. This often resulted in stalemates 
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between NHIS providers and managers, and affected the delivery of 
quality, efficient, and effective health care services to NHIS subscribers. 
 
In health insurance, most medical claims processes are outsourced to 
professional entities whose high skills in the field allow them to 
efficiently manage claims management faster. For example, Korea and 
Japan, which both have government-run health insurance, have 
independent institutions solely responsible for the review and 
reimbursement of health insurance claims. 
 
Over the years, Ghana has undertaken several reforms to make the 
NHIS more efficient, attractive, and sustainable over the long term. To 
facilitate the process of claims payment and prevent fraud and abuse, 
the NHIS in 2012 started e-claims management to inject discipline in 
claims processing, management, and review as well as facilitate early 
payment of claims to service providers. This new system centralized 
claims reviews and the reimbursement process and allowed the 
detection and elimination of errors associated with claims payments to 
minimize abuse. It also checked for spurious claims and fraud and 
provided information on the quality of health care rendered. 
Considerable improvement was thus seen in the payment of claims 
submitted by service providers. Available statistics indicate that the 
overall adjustment rate of the electronic-based NHIS claims processing 
system was significantly higher than that of the paper-based manual 
system. The e-claims system eventually became efficient in claims 
review and reimbursement since it improved the early payment of 
medical claims, thereby incentivizing service providers to render 
continuous quality of service to subscribers. Through data mining, the 
system also provided an overview of the pattern of care, thus providing 
the required information for policy direction within the Ghanaian health 
sector. 
 
1.1. Development Challenges 
 
The development challenges associated with claims processing, 
management, and payment in Ghana’s NHIS are delays in claims 
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processing due to the volume of paper claims, errors and fraud, 
duplication, and non-coherence of treatment and diagnosis. 
 
After its inception, claims management within the NHIS was done 
manually, something that proved labor intensive and inefficient. All 
claims were vetted and evaluated on an individual basis and a staggering 
1,200–4,800 staff weeks were need to review each month’s claims. 
Maintaining this schedule also required hundreds of employees.  
 
▌Table 2-1 ▌ Labor Simulation for  
Processing One Month of NHIS Claims 
Source: Wang et al, 2017 
 
This management of the paper claims interface resulted in delayed 
claims vetting, processing, and payment, often resulting in late claims 
reimbursement to service providers. In 2012 alone, the NHIS was 
managing a massive 25 million paper claims. In 2010, the health care 
entity was receiving and processing manual claims from 4,004 health 
care providers all over Ghana. The huge volume of paper claims (as 
shown in figures 1, 2 and 3) often resulted in delayed submission, 
processing, and payment of claims. Most submitted claims suffered 
from duplicate submission, lack of complete information, or other data 
needed to justify the claims, invalid codes, or coverage issues that 
included no coverage based on the date of service provided, non-
covered and/or non-networked benefit or service, coordination of 
  
Minutes 
spent 
on 
each claim 
No. of staff weeks 
needed 
to process  
each 
month’s claims 
No. of staff Weeks  
needed to  
process each 
month’s claims 
Scenario 1: One staff member vets  
100 claims per day 
4.8 4,800 1,200 
Scenario 2: One staff member vets  
200 claims per day 
2.4 2,400 600 
Scenario 3: One staff member vets  
400 claims per day 1.2 1,200 300 
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benefits, or coverage determination. Abuse was thus common as it was 
extremely difficult to detect fraud and the transparency of claims status.   
 
▌Figure 2-1 ▌ Manual Management of Claims at Service Provider Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Perry Nelson (NHIS), Presentation on Technology for Universal Health Coverage 
(IT4UHC, 2013) 
 
No documented evidence exists on the rejection rates of health 
insurance claims submitted by service providers in Ghana on a national 
scale. The Tamale Teaching Hospital, however, recorded a range of 10-
25 percent of rejected claims in 2009. Moreover, challenges and 
questions arose related to claims administration and management. 
Specific technical problems at the provider level resulted in the rejection 
of unverifiable claims mainly due to poor filing systems. This resulted 
in missing folders of treated clients. In addition, the filling out of claims 
forms was often incomplete, especially lacking critical information like 
the claim number, procedure done, and ICD 10, G-DRGs. Other 
challenges appeared in the verification of compliance with standard 
treatment guidelines for billing staff who generally lacked a medical 
background. One such instance was the “transcription of a doctor’s 
diagnosis of enteritis as enteric fever on claims forms by certain billing 
officers without the requisite medical background.”2 
 
                                            
2 Author interview (2017) 
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▌Figure 2-2 ▌ Manual Management of Claims at NHIS Level  
(NHIS District Offices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Perry Nelson (NHIS), Presentation on Technology for Universal Health Coverage 
(IT4UHC, 2013) 
 
    Moreover, the working environment was incredibly stressful due to 
the mountain of paperwork. Most claims management offices were 
overcrowded and poor or lack of information flow occurred between the 
NHIS and service providers, sometimes leading to conflicts. 
 
▌Figure 2-3 ▌ Manual Management of Claims at Claim Processing Center in Accra  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Perry Nelson (NHIS), Presentation on Technology for Universal Health Coverage 
(IT4UHC, 2013) 
 
Claims adjustment, or the ratio of the cost of erroneous claims to 
that of total claims, was also a major challenge under the system of 
manual claims processing. Claim adjustment saw no or limited 
transparency. The lack of clinical staff across administrative districts 
nationwide to review the huge volume of paper claims made it 
incredibly difficult for NHIS providers (e.g., medical facilities, clinics, 
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hospitals, pharmacies, and laboratories) to justify claims adjustment. 
“At the service provider level, inadequate knowledge and competence 
of claims personnel often resulted in errors and abuse, such as poor or 
incomplete documentation of claims forms, duplication of claims, 
wrong applications for tariffs, and overbilling,”3 said the deputy claims 
manager at the NHIS. Compounding the situation was that both the 
service providers and the NHIS spent huge sums of money on 
generating, transporting, and storing claims generated by the paper-
based claims system. Moreover, the laborious and lengthy process of 
paper claims management led to “corruption and collusion among and 
between service providers and staff of NHIS.”13 Between 2012 and 2014, 
“the NHIS had recouped 18 million Ghanaian cedis (US$7.4 million) 
charged through fraudulent claims by service providers.” 
 
In taking on these logistical challenges associated with manual claim 
processing such as delays in claims submission, processing, and 
payment, difficulty in detection of errors and abuse, and lack of 
transparency in claims management, the NHIS in 2010 adopted 
innovative strategies to raise efficiency and reduce the cost of claims 
management. Such intervention was mainly intended to help provide 
insight into the NHIS’s claims management system. The first step in this 
direction was the establishment and consolidation of claims processing 
by opening a claims processing center (CPC) in Accra for handling the 
massive volume of paper claims as a centralized location to improve 
efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 Author interview (2017) 
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▌Figure 2-4 ▌ Flowchart on NHIS Claims Process (Manual) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Sodzi-Tettey et al (2012) 
 
1.2. Delivery Challenges 
 
The NHIS faced technical, human resource, and financial delivery 
challenges in e-claims implementation. The main technical challenges 
were the inefficient use of computer software for claims processing due 
to the inherent delays in executing commands and the limited ability to 
verify written diagnoses due to the lack of a medical background by 
claims officials. Most facilities relied on temporary workers, especially 
National Service Secretariat (NSS) personnel, to manage NHIS claims. 
Such staff lacked the medical background to properly vet and enter the 
right diagnoses and treatments. The lack of information technology (IT) 
equipment like computers, printers, and internet servers and 
infrastructure at health care provider sites also compounded the problem. 
Most accredited health care facilities either lacked the IT equipment 
needed to implement the e-claims system or their staff managing the 
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claims process were lacking in the IT skills necessary to effectively 
manage the new system of claims management.  
 
Low internet connectivity across the country was a far bigger worry. 
According to the National Communication Authority, internet 
penetration in Ghana fell below 15 percent in 2012, making difficult the 
implementation of a national IT deployment system like that of e-claims. 
As Heeks (2003) noted, most government IT projects have a high failure 
rate around the world, and the NHIS needed a system that was both 
acceptable and effective even in areas with no web connectivity. 
“Confronted with this challenge, we resorted to design an offline claims 
generation with validation to cater to the needs of several facilities 
dotted around areas where internet access was a problem.”4 Several 
other facilities were located in areas that lacked power (electricity) 
assurance. Therefore, the NHIS had accepted a limited volume of paper 
claims from these facilities, which were also working on installing solar 
energy to utilize the e-claims system. 
 
Second, human resource challenges in the delivery process were 
reflected in unmet needs in staff training and severe labor shortages 
complicated by the rapid annual turnover of NSS personnel. To resolve 
the training issue, the NHIS offered several courses at two levels. 
Through the authority’s technical and operational staff, technical 
training and guidance on policy were offered on things like what 
services could be rendered where, what services were available, and 
how to generate claims. “The challenge has always been high staff 
turnover at the service provider level. You offer thorough training to a 
staff member but through redundancy, he or she is gone, gone with no 
knowledge transfer at the facility to allow continuity or efficient 
generation of claims.”5 In this regard, the NHIS more often than not had 
to organize mop-up training and repeatedly emphasized to providers 
their sole responsibility for the claims they generate. Unfortunately, 
                                            
4 Author interview (2017) 
5 Author interview (2017) 
 
CHAPTER 2 How Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Used the Electronic  
  Claims Management System to Streamline and Boost Efficiency in Claims Management    45 
many managers at such service providers failed to see the importance of 
investing in claims personnel to help them generate claims. But through 
continuous and consistent emphasis of the importance of generating the 
right claims, most managers eventually realized the need to improve 
their claims-generating capacity. “Because the claims actually come in 
as invoices. the invoices, when gotten wrong, cost us money. So a lot of 
us were actually investing in personnel to process our claims.”6 The 
NHIS also had courses, training sessions and packages that kept their 
staff abreast of the latest issues over the implementation process period 
and beyond. 
 
The third challenge was financial, especially at the service provider 
level. Since the NHIS was in debt to most service providers because of 
the delays in claims submissions, processing, and payment, most 
providers lacked the financial muscle to finance e-claims installation at 
their facilities. Moreover, most had to hire temporary staff to manage 
their claims since they could not afford permanent employees. 
 
 
2. Tracing the Implementation Process 
 
To streamline and raise the efficiency of Ghana’s claims management, 
the NHIS in 2010 initiated several processes to smoothen claims 
generation, processing, and payment. Learning from the experience of 
each process, the organization modified and adopted new strategies to 
meet the requirements of the claims management process. This 
ultimately yielded the development and deployment of a national system 
of e-claims management to resolve logistical challenges in paper-based 
claims management, boost efficiency in claims processing, offer 
transparency to providers, and give the NHIS credible claims data for 
analysis. 
 
 
                                            
6 Author interview (2017) 
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2.1. Setup of Claims Processing Center (Accra, 2010) 
 
After its inception, the NHIS conducted paper-based claims 
processing and management at its district mutual insurance scheme 
(DMIS) offices. As part of a management efficiency drive designed to 
unify the system, the NHIS moved away from DMIS processing of 
claims because of the need for standardization of the process. And 
because claims processing requires high-level skills that sometimes 
require the intervention of medical personnel like doctors, the NHIS had 
an insufficient number of medical practitioners to station at the 145 
districts. “To have over 145 DMIS offices process insurance claims with 
the same caliber of staff was virtually impossible, and we needed to 
maintain standardization in our policy enforcement. Hence the need to 
consolidate claims processing arose.”7 The opening of Ghana’s first 
claims processing center (CPC) in Accra in 2010 was to see how 
efficient it was to consolidate claims processing resources. This CPC 
started processing all claims from the Greater Accra region, regional and 
teaching hospitals, and the Volta area. The NHIS said, “The results 
yielded close to 15 percent of claims adjustment due to efficiency, and 
with that, the concept’s coverage was expanded to several parts of the 
country.”8  
 
2.2 Expansion of CPCs in Other Zones (2012) 
 
Based on the returns the central CPC in Accra was generating, the 
NHIS in 2012 opened more CPCs to cover the Northern region, the 
middle Brong-Ahafo belt, and the Western and Central areas. Other 
CPCs were opened in Tamale, Kumasi, and Cape Coast as shown in the 
map (as in Figure 5). The intent was to have the centers take over and 
manage claims processing. By jurisdiction, the CPC in Accra handled 
the Eastern, Volta, and Greater Accra regions, while the one in Cape 
Coast covered the Western and Central areas. The Tamale CPC was 
                                            
7 Author interview (2017) 
8 Author interview (2017) 
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assigned the Upper East, Upper West, and Northern regions, and the one 
in Kumasi covered Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo.  
 
▌Figure 2-5 ▌ Map of Ghana with 4 CPCs 
The CPCs required uniform applications or software. To effectively 
manage them, the NHIS began the e-claims system with the digitization 
of claims. The paper-based claims submitted by DMIS offices were 
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converted and processed into a uniform application. After piloting this 
concept, the NHIS realized that this laborious undertaking required an 
enormous volume of transcribing because the organization lacked the 
object recognition (OCR) technology to transcribe scanned images, 
coupled with the problems of scribbling by medical personnel of 
medical diagnoses and prescriptions. The need was evident for a 
strategy for acquiring or getting direct e-claims from service providers. 
But getting direct claims from the providers required massive resources 
and training. As indicated earlier, the Ghanaian health sector lacked 
sufficient provisions for ICT skills. So the NHIS had several facilities 
that lack even one IT professional. Overcoming this major bottleneck 
would prove instrumental in the NHIS’s success in acquiring direct 
claims from certain service providers. 
 
The NHIS itself, however, took on the task of advocating for the 
health sector to woo IT professionals under the agenda of technological 
advancement. The World Bank recognized this vision, and buying into 
the concept of e-claims, supported this agenda with funding through the 
bank’s Health Insurance Project to form the basis for e-claims 
processing. Achieving that, however, required standardization of a 
specific data set because several hospital information systems used their 
own data formats.  
 
2.3. Standardization  
(Health Data Dictionary and Medical Terminology, 2012) 
 
With several service providers using their own hospital information 
systems with various data set formats, the NHIS in 2012 standardized 
health data to provide a uniform platform for data entry, analysis, and 
interpretation. “For a typical example like date of birth, a system can decide 
to maintain or capture a date of birth as date/month/year (DDMMYYYY); 
another system might decide to capture the same date of birth as 
month/day/year (MMDDYYYY).” 9  This illustrated the need for 
                                            
9 Author interview (2017) 
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standardization and conformity to standardize data interpretation across the 
board for easy interchangeability of various data sets. So to achieve an 
efficient claims management project, the NHIS presented standardization 
and a health data dictionary as its major accomplishments. The dictionary 
indicated that “when we talk about this data set, this is what we are looking 
at and these are the valid elements you could utilize for the set and so 
forth.”10 Various forms of data. Data dictionaries in various forms were 
developed for integrated claims deployment including one for Ghana 
diagnostic-related groups (GDRGs). After implementing this, the NHIS set 
standards for the transition to e-claims called XML. These standards 
designated a required format for data submission regardless of solution or 
hospital information system used to submit an e-claim. So XML standards 
were applied to all hospitals and facilities with hospital information systems.  
 
For facilities without hospital information systems, the NHIS created 
an online interface called the “work front end.” This allowed service 
providers to log on and capture their claims directly on the NHIS e-
claims platforms. But because such facilities mostly lacked internet 
access, the NHIS developed an in-house application that offered an 
offline solution in claims processing to bridge the gap for facilities 
lacking in internet connectivity. “Internet connectivity challenges meant 
that work came to a standstill, and also that a service provider needed 
active connection to the NHIS interface before it could effectively 
capture information. Meanwhile, these facilities had insufficient 
resources to invest in a hospital information system. So the NHIS’s 
offline claims solution was a stop-gap approach.”11 
 
2.4. Stepping Up Clinical Audits (2012) 
 
After the centralization of claims processing and the setup of 
standardized data, the NHIS saw considerable improvement in claims 
processing. As indicated in a case writer interview, “The institution of 
                                            
10 Author interview (2017) 
11 Author interview (2017) 
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the clinical audit function for regular clinical audits within the NHIS 
empowered facilities to review claims submitted for payment, and this 
resulted in savings of GHC 22.3 million (US$5 million) as of December 
2012, or a cost reduction of 10.8 percent. In 2013, the cost savings 
reached GHC 1.9 million (US$450,000), or a cost reduction of 3.2 
percent.”12 The NHIS, however, faced the challenge of unusual trends or 
patterns in the claims submitted given the differences in diagnoses; for 
instance, various treatments and clients were treated for the same illness 
at various facilities over the same period. This prompted the NHIS to 
adopt a standardized system for clinical auditing that ensured the proper 
staffing and resources at facilities to render the required services to 
subscribers. The NHIS then rolled out clinical auditing based on 
validating or processing claims. “We come to see a trend and it then 
triggers validation of what is indeed happening, and based on claims 
processing, we can pick out patterns that require us to validate.”13 This 
process is called quality control, and through this, the NHIS organized 
verification exercises, with clinical auditing itself sampling facilities 
based on what is happening and on the plan of the quality assurance 
directorate. “For verification exercises, however, they are triggered by 
the kind of claims we are getting. Be it that the claim size is a skeleton, 
certain practices need to be investigated. Among the claims, each 
verification exercise is triggered if submitted claims are detected to have 
certain patterns failing to meet the NHIS standards. The resulting 
assessment report is to be submitted to the Compliance Unit of the 
NHIS, which is designated to ensure that facilities comply with NHIS 
standards for claims submission.”14   
 
2.5. E-claims Pilot Program (April 2013) 
 
Despite seeing success in the consolidation of claims processing and 
clinical auditing to sanitize claims management, the NHIS was still 
                                            
12 Author interview (2017) 
13 Author interview (2017) 
14 Author interview (2017) 
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unable to process claims timely and effectively. To promote a claims 
management system to improve claims processing, validation, and 
payment as well as provide available data for the policy planning 
process for the health sector, a pilot program for e-claims processing 
was instituted in April 2013 at 47 health care facilities with support 
from the Health Insurance Project of the World Bank. A number of 
criteria were adopted in selecting the pilot facilities, the most critical 
being the need to have qualified human resources to manage the e-
claims system as well as the IT works required to manage the system. 
The executive management of these facilities also needed to accept the 
e-claims system to qualify for the pilot program. This operation served 
as the introduction of direct e-claims submission to service providers 
and offered a robust uniform technology platform for claims 
management done effectively, efficiently, and economically. Under this 
process, the NHIS enhanced its business process management, 
developed the software for implementing a national claims register, and 
set up a claims verification unit. 
 
These initial 47 facilities generated 880,000 claims within three 
months after the pilot program commenced. Meanwhile, the NHIS 
commissioned a team of IT trainers and data entry personnel to travel to 
and “hold hands”15 at facilities nationwide to prepare for national 
implementation.  
 
2.6. National Launch of E-claims System (4Q of 2013) 
 
Based on the experience of the initial rollout over the pilot period, 
the NHIS finally instituted the e-claims system nationwide in the fourth 
quarter of 2013. Health care facilities with preexisting IT infrastructure 
saw easy setup, while those lacking such equipment received an 
arranged credit facility with an IT company, which granted IT 
equipment the facilities needed for e-claims implementation. The credit 
system was intended to have the facilities return the investment made in 
                                            
15 Author interview (2017) 
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them. “The facility bridged the funding gap due to the delay in claims 
reimbursement that prevented most service providers from growing and 
investing in their operations. This allowed them to invest in technology 
and general operations of their facilities.”16  
 
This new e-claims system streamlined the claims submission, vetting, 
and processing systems and provided the facilities with two options. A 
facility with a standardized hospital information system could generate 
and directly submit claims via the installed e-claims software. The other 
option was conducting claims generation and submission through a web 
front. This system ensured substantial cost reduction for both service 
providers and the NHIS as well as long-term sustainability for the 
organization. 
 
▌Figure 2-6 ▌ Flowchart on NHIS E-claims Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NHIS Ghana. 
 
In addition to the considerable improvement made in claims 
processing, data in the health care sector are now readily available to 
allow analysis by the NHIS and the Ghana Health Service (GHS) and 
training of staff. “Electronic claims are advantageous in that they offer 
                                            
16 Author interview (2017) 
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us the ability and offer this data for research as well, in contrast to 
paper-based claims that require data entry personnel to capture the data 
to allow us to make meaningful forecasting output.”17 
 
The success of the e-claims system was thanks to the effective 
communication strategy adopted by the NHIS. Major stakeholders such 
as hospitals and the Ghana Health Service through the Ministry of 
Health as part of the NHIS architecture were active players in the 
process. To the NHIS Staff and Management team, “the NHIS is a 
tripartite entity, we exist because we need our subscribers, we exist 
because we need our providers, and the scheme is what it is because of 
these parties. They are direct stakeholders and we cannot introduce any 
solution without actively engaging them for buy-in.” 
 
▌Table 2-2 ▌ Achievement of E-claims System 
(Membership, Utilization & Claims) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Cross-country Analyses of Reforms 
 
 
Source: NHIS Ghana, Annual Report (2014) 
 
 
 
 
                                            
17 Author interview (2017) 
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3. Lessons Learned 
 
The implementation of the NHIS’s e-claims system encountered 
technical, human resource, and financial challenges in delivery. The 
national adoption of the system in the last quarter of 2013 was a major 
success, exerting enormous impact on the quality of service delivery and 
sustainability. This was a story of the promotion of acceptability done 
through the partnership of the NHIS and stakeholders. The process was 
driven by continuous learning from implementation to informed 
decision making, and the strategies adopted combined inclusive and 
transparent processes that legitimized the decisions made in the 
implementation process. And to ensure simpler claims submission and 
processing, computerization and investment were adopted to improve 
and support the capacity of both NHIS managers and service providers. 
The lessons from the case study of Ghana’s NHIS offer help for other 
countries with problematic claims management in health insurance.  
 
3.1. Method of Efficiently Managing Health Insurance Claims 
 
The NHIS had to manage claims submitted by subscribers, and the 
introduction of the e-claims system confirmed the sustainability of 
health care financing through efficient management using an e-claims 
system with the built-in potential to flag adjustments due to error, 
omission, and duplication. The system improved NHIS claims 
management and reduced the cost of hiring a large number of staff for 
claims vetting, processing, transportation, and storage that had 
previously plagued the NHIS’s claims management process. This case 
study also highlighted the importance of stakeholders in creating such 
processes. 
 
3.2. Inducing Stakeholders to Participate in Reform via Incentives 
 
The NHIS adopted several approaches to offer incentives to 
stakeholders to participate in and adopt the e-claims system. Service 
providers who submitted claims through the new system were quickly 
reimbursed; credit facilities were also offered to service providers 
 
CHAPTER 2 How Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Used the Electronic  
  Claims Management System to Streamline and Boost Efficiency in Claims Management    55 
lacking IT equipment to enable the providers to acquire them. This 
process helped and motivated the providers to revamp their claims 
management systems and finally adopt the e-claims system. The offer of 
both technical and policy training to staff of both the NHIS and service 
providers enhanced the knowledge and delivery capabilities of 
personnel to run the e-claims system. Moreover, the NHIS also made it 
a requirement for a health care facility seeking NHIS accreditation to 
implement the e-claims system, and this got more service providers to 
join. 
 
3.3. Earning, Sustaining, and Managing Stakeholder Support 
 
The NHIS, from the onset of implementing its reform, understood 
the importance of its stakeholders. As an industry pacesetter in Ghana, 
the organization realized that engagement with stakeholders, especially 
service providers including the Christian Health Association of Ghana 
(CHAG), NHIS subscribers, and the Ghana Health Service, was critical 
for getting the needed support to effectively manage the new system. 
Continuous engagement with service providers made the latter realize 
the importance of the e-claims system and the potential reduction of cost 
and stress incurred in the claims management process by eliminating red 
tape and paperwork. 
 
3.4. Effective Implementation of Change 
 
The pilot operation of the e-claims system among the 47 service 
providers in the Greater Accra region gave the NHIS the wisdom to 
implement the system nationwide. This experience allowed the NHIS to 
effectively learn from the process and adapt it to the system’s national 
implementation. It also enabled the NHIS to put systems in place to 
ensure effective coordination and management. As Stephen Bewong 
aptly put it, “In any business, in any organization, in any operation, uh--
- you grow! And you grow by learning from mistakes, your grow by 
learning from your experience. Unfortunately in Ghana, the NHIS has 
had to chart its own path because we have nowhere else to learn from. 
So indeed, we had to learn from our mistakes and continue to re-
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engineer our business processes to enhance them. And that’s what we’ve 
been doing. And so yes, we continue to grow and learn from our 
mistakes.”18 No insurance entity in this world has all the answers to 
challenges in the industry. Even the U.S., one of the world’s biggest and 
oldest insurance markets, still struggles with fraud because the latter 
continues to re-engineer itself and insurers have to always try to be a 
step ahead of the game, catching up on trends, detecting loopholes, and 
continuing to seal them.  
 
The overall effectiveness of the e-claims process lies in the 
commitment of Ghana’s leadership to restructuring the NHIS’s claims 
management system. Since its inception in 2003, the NHIS has enjoyed 
goodwill commitment from both political and administrative leaders. 
This has spurred major reform to make the NHIS more efficient, 
attractive, and sustainable over the long term. The e-claims system 
comprises just a portion of several innovative reforms undertaken by the 
NHIS leadership. 
 
 
4. Implications for the Science of Delivery 
 
4.1. Adaptive Implementation 
 
The NHIS, from the onset, has maintained its commitment to 
successful reform through adaptive learning and restructuring. The 
centralization of the claims processing center led the organization to 
discover the challenges of digitizing the submitted claims as well as the 
difficulties of having vast data sets for different facilities. Learning from 
this experience enabled the team to standardize data to achieve 
uniformity and across-the-board data usage. It also led to significant 
investment in the IT infrastructure required for standardizing hospital 
information systems and ramping up clinical auditing due to the trends 
of data collated from the claims. This approach proved significant and 
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effective for the NHIS’s process reengineering and adaptation to 
improve reform and the system’s acceptability. 
 
4.2. Use of different strategies for reform 
 
 In its quest for better and more efficient claims management, the 
NHIS adopted several responses to meet the demands of the claims 
process. No one solution was deemed ideal to resolve problems in 
claims management, and a series of implementation processes created 
an effective atmosphere for learning and re-adjustment. 
 
4.3. Evidence-based strategies to achieve results 
 
The NHIS sought to use the knowledge, skills, and experience of 
multiple stakeholders to steer the implementation of reforms. Several 
consultations were held with strategic stakeholders like the Christian 
Health Association of Ghana, Ghana Health Service, Dental and 
Medical Council, a pharmaceutical group, and other civic organizations 
including research and academic groups; this enabled the NHIS to 
harness knowledge and strategies to achieve results. It also learned from 
several implemented initiatives, like the capitation grant and biometric 
registration of subscribers, to publicize the implementation process. 
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▌ Annexes ▌  
Annex A. Case Timeline  
Date Event 
Justification for Inclusion/ 
Relevance 
Notes 
2010 
Claims Processing 
Center (CPC) 
established in Accra 
Aimed to centralize claims 
processing from across 145 
district mutual health insurance 
schemes (DMHIS) 
First step to inject 
efficiency in claims 
management 
2012 
Expansion of CPCs 
to Kumasi, Cape 
Coast & Tamale 
Based on success of CPC in 
Accra, concept expanded to 
cover all regions of Ghana 
Feedback loop & 
innovation to 
centralized claims 
management 
2012 Standardization 
Establishment of health data 
dictionary & medical 
terminology aimed to 
standardize information for easy 
coding, entry & analysis 
Feedback loop & clear 
example of learning & 
adaptation based on 
implementation 
expenses 
(organizational change) 
2012 Expansion of clinical audits Served as measure to reduce cost 
Action emanated from 
feedback from data 
analysis of claims 
process (adaptation) 
April 
2013 
Pilot operation of e-
claims system with 
47 health care 
facilities 
Implementation of direct E-
claims submission from service 
providers 
Inflection point 
4Q of 
2013 
National adoption 
of E-claims system 
Based on feedback from pilot 
operation, national adoption 
implemented 
Adaptation & inflection 
point 
Note: This table highlights key inflection points in the implementation of the NHIS’s e-claim 
system to quickly summarize highlights of the main programs 
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Annex B. Interviewees List  
# Name Organization Contact Info 
1 Stephen Bewong NHIS, Accra 
Stephen.bewong 
@nhia.gov.gh 
2 Ishmael Selassie G. NHIS, Accra +233 302 238136 
3 Vivian Addo-Cobbiah NHIS, Accra +233 244370919 
4 Frank Mensah 
Komfo Anokye 
Hospital, Kumasi 
+233 203388678 
5 James Duah CHAG, Ghana +233 302 777 815 
6 Shahad Mohammed TTH, Tamale +233 246473013 
7 Veronica Asafo Adjei 
Ghana Health 
Service, Accra 
+233 302 685709 
 
Annex C. Stakeholder Map 
 
 
 
Annex D. Process map 
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Annex D. Process Map 
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CHAPTER 3 
  
Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction  
and Management in the Philippines: 
 A Science of Delivery Case Study 
 
By 
Ranel Ram Cheng1 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management  
 
Executive Summary 
 
This case study in the science of delivery examines the origins, 
evolution, and achievements of the sub-village unit purok in disaster risk 
reduction and management (DRRM) in the Municipality of San 
Francisco in the Philippine province of Cebu. In November 2013, 
Typhoon Haiyan (known in the Philippines as Yolanda), one of the 
strongest tropical cyclones in recorded history to make landfall, swept 
through the central islands of the archipelago. Yet San Francisco 
amazingly suffered zero casualties and began recovery immediately 
despite being geographically isolated from its mother province. Not so 
                                            
1 The author would like to thank the government and residents of the Municipality of 
San Francisco, especially Vice Mayor Alfredo Arquillano, Jr., Leoli Ortadilla, 
Rosalinda Serion, and Monica Tan of the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Office, 
and the purok officers of Tulang Diyot. Thanks also goes to Roy Soledad of the Cebu 
Investment and Promotions Office and Rizajoy Hernandez of the Office of Civil 
Defense-Region VII for providing additional background information. Special thanks 
goes to Pia Ranada and Patty Pasion for providing the initial contact information 
necessary to move forward with this case study. The author is also grateful to Korea 
Development Institute (KDI) and the Global Delivery Initiative for their support. The 
opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are the author’s and his alone and do 
not necessarily reflect the positions of the KDI School or its affiliates. Any remaining 
errors are the author’s and his alone. 
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fortunate were other local government units (LGUs), which were 
overwhelmed by the extent of damage inflicted by Haiyan.  
 
Originally designated a solid waste management project in 2004, the 
purok system evolved into a service delivery mechanism to reach 
vulnerable communities, and eventually into a grassroots-level system 
for DRRM even before the concept was officially adopted through the 
2010 passage of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Act. San Francisco pioneered the LGU’s implementation of DRRM, 
earning recognition both at home and abroad. This case study shows 
how the formative years (2004-10) in establishing the purok system 
provided the learning process for residents and municipal officials 
needed to overcome the challenge of coordination and engagement 
among the various levels of government and within communities for 
successful DRRM implementation by the time Haiyan hit in 2013. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known in the Philippines as 
Yolanda) became one of the strongest tropical cyclones in recorded 
history to make landfall. Of the country’s 80 provinces, the 44 affected 
by the mega-storm covered 591 municipalities, 57 cities, and 12,139 
barangays (villages), including Cebu Province and San Francisco. The 
typhoon’s death toll reached 6,300, including 74 casualties and five 
missing in northern Cebu Province (National Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Council, 2013).  
 
Despite being one of the towns directly hit by Haiyan, San Francisco 
amazingly recorded zero casualties. Through its unique purok system 
that organized communities at the sub-village level, this LGU carried 
out pre-emptive evacuations even in its farthest villages, ensuring that 
none of its 50,000-plus residents was left unaccounted for. Around 200 
families in Tulang Diyot, located on a separate islet, were brought to the 
mainland days before Haiyan made its first landfall. After the storm hit, 
the town immediately began rehabilitation efforts with minimal 
supervision, as neighboring LGUs—overwhelmed by the extent of the 
storm—were left immobilized.  
 
A number of studies and articles have documented the purok 
system’s success, especially in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan 
(Fernandez, Uy, & Shaw, 2012; McElroy, 2013; Ranada, 2014; 
Bawagan et al., 2015; Matthies, 2017) but none have analyzed the 
system’s implementation using the science of delivery approach. This 
case study focuses on the system’s evolution and implementation with 
emphasis on how development and delivery challenges were overcome 
to conduct community-based DRRM.  
 
1.1. Development Challenges: Vulnerability to Natural Disaster 
 
Located at the edge of the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines in a given 
year is hit by around 20 tropical cyclones of varying intensity. As part of 
the Camotes Islands in northern Cebu, San Francisco is no stranger to 
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these storms. Since 1948, 51 tropical cyclones have come within 50 
kilometers of the town’s boundaries, 20 of which directly crossed the 
cluster of islands including Typhoons Bising in 1982, Ruping in 1990, 
and Yolanda in 2013—the three most destructive storms in recent 
memory (Bawagan et al., 2015). A permanent memorial was erected in 
at the San Francisco town plaza to mark the day Bising destroyed the 
town hall in 1982. Surrounded by open sea, the town’s population 
mostly relies on natural resources to make a living, especially through 
farming and fishing. When a typhoon hits, residents are left at the mercy 
of the elements. 
 
1.2. Key Delivery Challenges  
 
Since its introduction in 2004, the purok system has undergone 
constant refinement to suit the specific needs of the town that have 
emerged over the years. The following section identifies key delivery 
challenges San Francisco faced in implementing the system. These 
challenges, though interrelated, grew more prominent at different stages 
in the evolution of the purok system. 
 
1.2.1. Geographic Access 
 
San Francisco is composed of the main island and an islet. The town 
is part of the Camotes Islands, which are geographically separated and 
accessible via a two-hour boat ride from Cebu Province. The town is 
classified as a third-class municipality comprising 15 barangays 
(villages). Its population grew from 41,327 in 2000 to 55,180 per the 
latest census in 2015. The major form of transportation to reach all 11 
coastal and four upland barangays is motorbike or motor tricycle. 
Houses are usually far and wide across the rough and gently sloping 
terrain. The island has yet to achieve full electrification, with many 
areas receiving rations of power at certain hours only. To get to the islet 
community of Tulang Diyot, for example, a 10-minute boat ride is 
needed from Barangay Esperanza on the mainland. The islet also has no 
running water and its community receives electricity rations for four to 
six hours daily, thus communication through radio or mobile is 
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relatively difficult. Getting from one side of the islet to the other takes 
roughly 40 minutes to an hour via motorbike. 
 
▌Table 3-1 ▌ Socioeconomic Profile of San Francisco                           
Income classification 3
rd-class municipality 
Annual income (2016) PHP 116.86 million 
Area 106.93 sq. km 
Population (2015) 55,180 
Population density 516.04 persons per sq. km 
No. of households (2015) 12,278 
Average household size (2015) 4.5 
Primary industries 
Small-scale commercial & subsistence fishing, corn, 
rice, coconuts, vegetables, & backyard livestock 
raising 
Major sources of 
family income 
Fishing, farming, self-employment in buy & sell 
businesses, employment in tourism & services 
Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority; Bureau of Local Government Finance; Bawagan et al., 2015 
 
1.2.2. Poor Coordination of and Engagement with Stakeholders 
 
San Francisco is primarily an agricultural town whose residents are 
mostly fishermen, farmers, or self-employed small-time traders. In 2006, 
just two years after the implementation of the purok system, the poverty 
level there was 60.7 percent. Residents rely largely on subsistence 
fishing and farming for food. In 2012, when the last municipal-level 
poverty survey was conducted, the town’s poverty level significantly 
decreased to 49.3 percent. Like in many poor communities across the 
Philippines, a welfare mentality has prevailed among residents, with 
little incentive for them to organize especially since purok positions 
were purely voluntary with no pay. For residents, taking time off from 
their occupations to do purok activities was considered a waste of time 
and even a source of conflict due to the misperception that purok leaders 
received favors from the town government. Disagreement and resistance 
also occurred among elected barangay officials, especially those who 
belonged to the political camp opposing the mayor. In the Philippines, 
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the barangays is the smallest unit of government that exercises 
autonomy to a degree. Thus in the eyes of certain officials, the purok 
system was viewed as redundant.  
 
▌Figure 3-1 ▌ Local Government Structure in the Philippines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Local Government Code of 1991; Image from Wikimedia Commons 
 
1.2.3. Lack of Proper Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
 
In 1978, the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) was 
created as an inter-agency body to oversee government responses to 
calamities. Disaster coordinating councils (DCCs) were organized at the 
regional, provincial, and city/municipal levels. In reality, however, this 
top-down approach proved ineffective in preparing communities since 
planning, announcements, and relief operations were highly centralized. 
Moreover, DCCs were convened only in the event of an emergency and 
had no permanent offices. This was the prevailing approach at the time 
Typhoons Bising and Ruping hit San Francisco. Reaching the farthest 
communities was difficult as their residents had no access to news or 
weather bulletins. As one resident recalled, people would begin disaster 
preparation only when they would “see the waves rise and the wind 
become stronger” or after hearing “rumors” from the mainland about a 
potential storm approaching. Evacuation orders would prove futile as 
certain residents would stay behind to secure their properties. Another 
resident of Tulang Diyot recalled how her father and five fishermen died 
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when their fishing boats capsized as they tried to get back on land 
during Typhoon Ruping in 1990. In the 1990s, the NDCC made a major 
paradigm shift from emergency management focused on preparedness 
and response to a disaster risk management approach that emphasized 
mitigation before a calamity struck (NDRRMC, 2011); but 
implementation remained top-down. Meanwhile in San Francisco, no 
other storm of similar magnitude struck the town, thus Bising and 
Ruping were slowly forgotten and residents moved on with their lives. 
Without permanent staff in charge at the LGU level, disaster mitigation 
was not a priority and municipal officers instead focused more on 
poverty alleviation and similar programs.  
 
Around this time, advocates lobbied for a new law to empower 
communities and introduce a bottom-up approach toward disaster risk 
management. But it was only after two decades and a series of major 
calamities that the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
(NDRRM) Act was passed in 2010. This law mandated the creation of 
disaster risk reduction and management offices (DRRMOs) at the 
municipal and barangay levels, so that DRRM could begin even at the 
smallest level of governance. Though the passage of the new law was 
welcomed as a “solid” framework, doubts arose over the effectiveness 
of its implementation, especially the promptness of disaster response 
operations given the complexity of the new structure (Commission on 
Audit, 2014). For San Francisco, the sub-village level purok did not 
have the same legal standing as a barangay government. Thus 
reconfiguration was needed on how this system could meet the 
requirements of the NDRRM Act.  
 
 
2. Contextual Conditions 
 
The purok system in San Francisco was originally not intended for 
disaster response and preparedness. Even before the enactment of the Local 
Government Code of 1991, the purok in the Philippines had served as an 
indigenous form of a self-organizing community smaller than a village-
level barangay, which is officially the country’s smallest administrative unit 
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of governance. Puroks were usually formed for ad hoc purposes such as 
holding fiestas. Selected puroks were where the Department of Education 
carried out the Alternative Learning System, which deployed teachers to 
reach out-of-school youths and unschooled adults who could not attend 
school in certain barangays. 
 
In 2004, Alfredo Arquillano Jr. was reelected mayor of San Francisco 
for a second three-year term. At the time, he wanted to start a solid 
waste management program to clean up the town’s streets and beaches 
to develop a viable tourist attraction for domestic and foreign tourists. 
He looked into tapping the purok system so that residents could take the 
initiative to clean up and improve their communities. Each purok is 
organized as a people’s organization composed of 50-100 households. In 
comparison, a typical barangay in San Francisco comprises an average 
of around 800 households. Members elect officers and the heads of eight 
committees based on the committees formed in each barangay. In other 
words, the purok can be considered a miniature barangay. A key feature 
is that the system works on a voluntary basis, or pintakasi in the 
Cebuano language. This means that membership is not mandatory for 
residents and elected purok officers get no compensation for their roles. 
In addition, Mayor Arquillano was adamant that the purok system 
should incur little cost to the municipal government, meaning no 
handouts or financial subsidies provided in setting up the puroks. 
 
Over the years, the purpose of the purok system has evolved from 
managing solid waste to fighting malnutrition and improving livelihood, 
and most notably preparing for and responding to disasters. For its 
efforts, San Francisco is considered a “Hall of Famer” as the cleanest 
and greenest municipality in Cebu Province, having received awards 
from the provincial and national governments. The United Nations 
Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) has also designated the town 
as a model resilient city. 
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3. Tracing the Implementation Process: “Think Big, Start Small” 
 
Over the years, the purok system in San Francisco has evolved and 
been utilized for a variety of purposes. This section traces the system’s 
origins and how it became the primary vehicle for community-based 
reduction and management of disaster risk that led to zero casualties 
during Typhoon Haiyan. At each stage of implementation, government 
officials and residents faced - and overcame - delivery challenges and 
refined the system toward building more resilient communities. 
 
3.1. Establishment (2004-08) 
 
   After winning a second term in office as mayor, Alfredo Arquillano Jr. 
named solid waste management as a priority project. He wanted to 
mobilize town residents to clean their own surroundings to transform 
San Francisco into a “clean and green” municipality that would attract 
tourists. He lamented the lack of both initiative and collaboration among 
households. This was the context under which he wanted to organize 
households into puroks to carry out his project. 
 
3.1.1. Setting Up the Structure: “Start Small” 
 
   Prior to entering politics, Arquillano managed his family’s fishing 
business for almost 15 years. Over that time, he wanted to introduce 
new technologies to make fishing more cost efficient. His proposal was 
met with resistance , however, from several of his employees unwilling 
to switch from the traditional style of fishing they had used for years. 
This did not discourage Arquillano, who then decided to introduce new 
equipment one piece at a time. He described the “wait-and-see attitude” 
of his men, who slowly but surely embraced his innovations. This lesson 
was what he used to introduce the purok system in San Francisco. 
 
   Initial talks were held first with one purok, Danao in Barangay West 
Poblacion, close to the town hall. A few weeks later, two more puroks 
were added, Bokok in Barangay Northern Poblacion and Can-Ising in 
Barangay Southern Poblacion. These three puroks served as pilot sites 
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for the new system the mayor wanted to install. Over the initial months 
of implementation, town officials explained to residents how the system 
would work. Each purok would elect a president, vice president, 
secretary, and the heads of eight committees patterned after the 
barangay (Health and Nutrition; Agriculture and Livelihood; Education 
and Solid Waste Management; Peace and Order; Tourism, Women, and 
Children; Infrastructure; Youth and Sports; and Finance, Budget, and 
Appropriations). Through these committees, purok residents could 
identify specific needs to mention at the proper town office. For 
example, the Committee on Health and Nutrition could coordinate with 
the Municipal Health Office possible medical outreach for residents. To 
show their seriousness, the town government delivered basic services 
such as roads, electricity, and water supply to these pilot puroks to build 
trust and improve relations with the community. One thing made clear, 
however, was that puroks would operate on a voluntary basis and that 
residents could not expect handouts from the town government. Each 
purok would have to work for its share. In the system’s first year, a 
purok beautification contest awarded cash prizes to winning 
communities based on criteria such as best solid waste management, 
holding of regular monthly meetings, and maintenance of a vegetable 
garden.  
 
▌Figure 3-2 ▌ Structures of Barangay and Purok in San Francisco 
Source: MDDRMO-San Francisco  
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3.1.2. Purok Coordinators as Liaison to Barangay Officials and Residents 
 
Initially, Mayor Arquillano designated one of his staff members, 
Leoli “Yul” Ortadilla, as purok coordinator to serve as the liaison to the 
communities. Ortadilla’s main role was to organize households in close 
proximity into puroks, as well as providing feedback to the mayor on 
the problems and progress of the puroks. When it was time to add more 
communities to the initial three, Ortadilla recruited additional purok 
coordinators to help. To reach all 15 barangays in San Francisco, each 
barangay was classified into one of three districts according to location: 
Central, North, and South. Assisting Ortadilla were two purok 
coordinators who visited the five barangays in each district. 
Coordinators were officially on the town’s payroll as staff under the 
Office of the Mayor, and received a transportation allowance to perform 
their duties. 
 
Before setting up a purok, the coordinator first had to talk to the 
elected barangay captain and kagawad (councilors) to explain the new 
system being set in place. According to the local government code, each 
barangay must elect seven kagawad. In this regard, each kagawad 
ideally takes charge of monitoring one purok and attends their meetings. 
Because the system was organized primarily according to geographic 
location, more puroks emerged to allow easier management. Through 
this method, the system expanded to cover all 15 barangays in San 
Francisco while gaining support from elected barangay officials. In 
2007, the Municipal Council of San Francisco passed an ordinance 
granting legal status to the purok as a public organization that serves as 
a community service unit to support a barangay. Throughout the process, 
the coordinators closely monitored the progress of the puroks and 
reported directly to the mayor. The coordinators attended the monthly 
meeting of each purok under their watch, and went to weekly meetings 
at the town hall to give feedback on the system’s implementation or 
convey any difficulties encountered in the field and suggest solutions.  
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3.1.3. Initial Expansion and Achievements 
 
   To support the coordinators’ operations, the San Francisco 
government provided initial funding for capital build-up (CBU) to 
puroks, which helped finance the building of the purok meeting hall. 
Residents raised additional funds on their own. The puroks were 
empowered to draft their own organizational rules like any other public 
organization. For example, they could collect regular monthly 
contributions from their members and impose fines for non-attendance 
at activities or violation of purok rules. The money collected was used to 
purchase office supplies needed for meetings and any administrative 
costs incurred (mostly office supplies). The CBU fund was also used as 
the initial seed money for microfinance, which purok members could 
access in case of emergency (Matthies, 2017). Beyond this, puroks 
received no monetary compensation or financial assistance. Instead, 
purok officers were given priority in selection for training and capacity-
building programs organized by the town government. The purok 
system also introduced to San Francisco the community health 
management system and Food Always at Home (FAITH), a food 
livelihood program, in partnership with Plan International Philippines 
and other NGOs.  
 
   The first five years of the project were crucial in establishing 
communication, building trust, and maintaining a strong relationship 
between the town government and purok communities. Because of its 
voluntary nature, the system was plagued by inactivity among members 
and even officers, but through the help of coordinators, it persisted. 
Slowly but steadily, results began to show. The number of underweight 
and severely malnourished children significantly declined over this 
period since community health services were delivered through puroks 
from 2006. The town became a model LGU for community nutrition 
and was honored as the cleanest and greenest municipality in Cebu 
Province in 2008, among other achievements. Part of the cash prizes the 
town received from these awards was re-distributed as cash prizes for 
purok competitions. In its early years, the purok evolved into not only a 
reliable mode of service delivery encompassing solid waste 
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management, nutrition, and livelihood, but also a means to strengthen 
social cohesion at the grassroots level (Matthies, 2017). 
 
3.2. Introducing Disaster Risk Management to San Francisco 
(2008-11) 
 
   Typhoons are an accepted part of life in the Philippines. The 
government and even civic responses to such storms have largely been 
reactive, focusing on relief distribution and rescue operations 
(NDRRMC, 2011; Bawagan et al., 2015). Residents and even town 
officials of San Francisco admitted that after Typhoons Bising and 
Ruping hit, the town lacked consciousness to prepare for the next 
disaster. Luckily, though San Francisco was still frequently hit by 
storms in the annual monsoon season, no typhoon of such intensity hit 
the islands. And had it not been for a series of major natural calamities 
in surrounding provinces, San Francisco might not have introduced 
reduction and management of disaster risk into its collective 
consciousness. 
 
3.2.1. Planting Seeds of DRRM:  
National-level Lobbying with Local-level Mainstreaming 
 
   In the 1980s, the non-governmental organization (NGO) Plan 
International Philippines began operations in the Camotes Islands, but 
its programs back then largely focused on simply linking donors to 
foster families living in the area. In the early 2000s, the NGO shifted 
from its developmental approach of doling out help to beneficiaries 
toward a community-based approach by closely working with residents 
and regional governments. Around this time, Roy Soledad, a former 
Plan International Philippines technical officer who would later head the 
NGO’s Camotes Islands program unit, worked with the four 
municipalities of the island group in implementing the organization’s 
community-based nutrition program. The towns had tapped their 
respective indigenous puroks but Soledad noted that in his engagement 
as a civic officer, San Francisco had the most organized and consistent 
system in place. Pilar had relatively smaller barangays and thus had no 
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immediate utility to engage communities through puroks. Meanwhile, 
Tudela was locked in a political battle when an election protest was filed 
against the incumbent mayor. Finally, enthusiasm from the Poro town 
government eventually died down despite minimal engagement. In the 
early 2000s, engagement with civil society in Camotes focused largely 
on health and nutrition, as well as livelihood projects. 
 
   In February 2006, a series of mudslides occurred in the town of Saint 
Bernard in the neighboring province of Southern Leyte. One village, 
Guinsaugon, was almost entirely covered by rocks and mud, causing 
more than 1,000 deaths. This deadly event served as a wake-up call on 
how ill-equipped residents, the government, and NGOs were in handling 
such a disaster. The Guinsaugon landslide became a rallying point for a 
paradigm shift from mere relief and rescue operations to a more 
proactive risk management. In 2008, more than 300 civic organizations, 
academics, and government agencies including the Office of Civil 
Defense (OCD), which had served as the secretariat for the National 
Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) at the time, formed the Disaster 
Risk Reduction Network Philippines (DRRNetPhils). This umbrella 
organization lobbied for the passage of a comprehensive National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) Law (Bawagan et 
al., 2015). While DRRNetPhils engaged the Philippine Congress and 
national agencies to adopt the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in 
the drafting of the NDRRM Law, the OCD, through the NDCC, had 
started the shift toward disaster risk reduction, albeit without the support 
structures and legal framework. Additionally, the efforts of civic groups 
on the ground started capacity building for communities. And Plan 
International Philippines decided to move beyond nutrition and 
livelihood to become a disaster relief agency as well.  
 
3.2.2. San Francisco as “Resilient Town”:  
When Preparation Meets Opportunity 
 
In the latter half of 2008, Roy Soledad returned to the Camotes 
Islands to introduce programs for disaster risk reduction and 
management of Plan International-Philippines to the area, including San 
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Francisco. Through the relationship they had built over the years, the 
town government led by Mayor Arquillano was receptive to Soledad’s 
idea but insisted that such DRRM programs include a livelihood 
component. The partnership between the NGO and the town was forged 
later in the year and implementation began in 2009. Community-based 
DRRM was operationalized at the purok level. Because funding for this 
program was limited (as Plan International Philippines prepared to 
officially phase out its Camotes Islands unit by 2011), the project 
required immediate execution focusing on coastal resource management, 
education, hazard mapping, early warning, and capacity building. Also 
around this time, San Francisco via the NGO network had grown 
familiar with the Sasakawa Award for Disaster Reduction by the 
UNISDR, which incorporated “A Documentation of the 10-Point 
Checklist” (2011) as part of the nomination submission process. Mayor 
Arquillano said that because the checklist was straightforward and 
easily understandable, this served as a tool for monitoring the 
implementation of the programs. Despite limited funding, support from 
civic groups, together with the town’s application for the award and the 
US$25,000 cash prize, served as motivation for the town to proceed 
with its community-based DRRM program. In 2009, Plan International 
Philippines donated a digital and manual rain gauge to help San 
Francisco conduct basic weather forecasting on its own. Area schools 
also joined the effort, so that in addition to purok-based capacity 
building, students and teachers were also trained in disaster preparation.  
 
About the same time, development at the national level had wide 
implications for towns like San Francisco. In September 2009, Typhoon 
Ondoy (international name Ketsana) left the Philippine capital region of 
Metro Manila flooded, killing more than 400 alone. A week after, 
another typhoon, Pepeng (international name Parma), hit northern 
Luzon. The devastation caused by these powerful storms highlighted the 
need for climate change adaptation in government policy, leading to the 
passage of Republic Act 9729 or the Climate Change Act. This law, in 
turn, led to the foundation of the Climate Change Commission under the 
Office of the President in October the same year. Yet the poor response 
of the national government while these major typhoons hit highlighted 
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the NDCC’s inadequacy as a disaster response agency. The momentum 
from this renewed interest in climate change served as leeway for the 
NDRRM Law to get its best chance at passage after more than two 
decades of lagging in the legislative mill. In 2010, Congress finally 
passed Republic Act 10129 or the NDRRM Law, which created the 
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 
(NDRMMC) and mandated disaster risk reduction and management at 
the grassroots level of governance. Going beyond building the necessary 
structures, however, the new law provided required access to funds, 
mandating that at least five percent of a local government’s budget be 
allocated to a “local disaster management fund,” of which 70 percent 
went to disaster risk reduction and management. The remaining 30 
percent went to the quick response fund (QRF) to be immediately used 
for relief and rehabilitation if disaster struck. 
 
The law also mandated a permanent municipal disaster risk reduction 
and management office (MDRRMO) and the installation of DRRMCs 
from the barangay level. Because the purok in San Francisco operated as 
“little barangays,” it was a de facto DRRM committee. To avoid adding 
another layer of bureaucracy, the committee was headed by the purok 
vice president, which meant that the committee became a quasi-
umbrella committee primus inter pares. Yet keeping with the new law’s 
mandates proved to be difficult. Rosalinda Serion, a former municipal 
social welfare officer who once headed relief operations under the 
Municipal Disaster Coordinating Council and was later tapped as the 
MDRRM officer, said an entire level of bureaucracy had to be created 
from scratch. San Francisco also began to draft a five-year plan for local 
disaster risk reduction and management to integrate not only disaster 
risk reduction and management and climate change adaptation but also 
solid waste management and community development programs. What 
made the transition less difficult was that a number of requirements the 
law laid out were in place through the disaster risk reduction and 
management project with Plan International Philippines. Just tweaking 
certain jargon or complying with reporting and disclosure was all that 
was needed. The MDRRMO also began to take on capacity-building 
programs for communities, as well as maintaining municipal and 
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barangay relations, in accordance with the legal mandate. The series of 
external developments, from utilizing civic groups to the passage of 
national legislation, provided the opportunities allowing San Francisco 
to transform its purok system as a DRRM structure based on a working 
community. For its efforts, the town won the 2011 Sasakawa Award for 
Disaster Reduction, along with the cash prize it used in financing its 
local disaster risk reduction and management plan. 
 
3.3. Mobilizing Puroks for Effective Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management (2011-13) 
 
   A major strength of San Francisco’s disaster risk reduction and 
management was its policy of leaving nobody behind. The town’s plan 
covered vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly and the disabled. 
San Francisco also had a clear vision: “Zero Casualties and No 
Injuries.” In accordance with the new law, the anti-disaster plan 
incorporated three specific themes: disaster prevention, mitigation and 
preparedness, and response (Bawagan et al., 2015). The MDRRMO 
focused on education and training, especially for helping barangays set 
up their own DRRMCs. Among the key lessons were ensuring that 
families prepare “72-hour kits” containing important documents and 
basic provisions such as food, water, clothing, and cash for at least the 
first three days after an emergency. Evacuation plans were prepared and 
shelters were designated. The town also invested in installing Wi-Fi at 
the MDRRMO for easier monitoring. 
 
At this point, Mayor Alfredo Arquillano, Jr. in 2010 had to leave 
office after serving his term limit, and was succeeded by his older 
brother Aly as mayor. Alfredo Arquillano, Jr. then won election as the 
town’s vice mayor. Purok coordinators remained town employees but 
were later able to report directly to the town’s municipal council, of 
which the vice mayor is presiding officer. Spurred by the town’s 
international recognition, other LGUs in the Philippines visited San 
Francisco to learn more about its purok system. In 2013, Alfredo 
Arquillano, Jr. retired from government service while his older brother 
won a second term as mayor. Five months later, Typhoon Haiyan hit. 
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From November 2-4, a low pressure area began to develop in the 
Pacific; by November 5, the typhoon was forecast to hit the Philippines. 
The following day, it had officially entered the Philippine Area of 
Responsibility (PAR), designated as a super typhoon with the domestic 
name “Yolanda” (Santos, 2016). This was when the San Francisco 
MDRRMO began alerting barangay officials and issued preemptive 
evacuation orders, as well as prohibiting fishing in the town. Barangay 
and purok leaders were also mobilized to trim tree branches that could 
fall and become roadblocks (Bawagan et al., 2015; Santos, 2016). On 
the islet of Tulang Diyot, residents were transferred to the mainland. 
Fishermen began moving their boats to higher ground. Certain residents 
stayed at designated evacuation centers but others sought shelter with 
their relatives and neighbors on the mainland who had sturdier concrete 
houses. This “adopt-a-family approach” helped decongest evacuation 
shelters (Bawagan et al., 2015) while simultaneously highlighting the 
spirit of pintakasi (communal participation). By November 7, the day 
before the typhoon was expected to make its first landfall, all residents 
in Tulang Diyot had been accounted for. The municipal DRRMC had 
earlier convened to prepare relief and recovery efforts and was 
constantly updated by the national meteorological agency Philippine 
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration 
(PAGASA). By November 8, Haiyan swept through the Visayan islands, 
leaving a trail of destruction in its wake. In the immediate aftermath, 
San Francisco incurred economic losses of PHP 117.08 million, 
including agricultural damage worth PHP 16.64 million. Overall, 1,022 
homes, 17 school buildings, two rural health units, and four government 
buildings were damaged (Bawagan et al., 2015). True to the 
municipality’s plan, however, the town suffered zero casualties. 
 
In nearby areas including northern Cebu, LGUs were made helpless 
and became victims. The Commission on Audit (2014), in its post-
Yolanda assessment, said that three years into the passage of the 
NDRRM Law, many LGUs remained ill-equipped to respond to natural 
disasters, let alone one as destructive as Haiyan. The problems cited 
included inadequate skills and expertise of response personnel, a poor 
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system of emergency management and distribution, and lack of critical 
equipment and logistical infrastructure since many LGUs had yet to 
integrate DRRM into their development plans by the time Haiyan had 
hit (COA, 2014). Despite a few shortcomings including reported 
congestion at a few evacuation centers and three residents who allegedly 
sustained minor injuries (Bawagan et al., 2015), San Francisco 
translated all its plans and preparation into concrete actions.  
 
 
4. Lessons Learned: “Start Small, Think Big” 
 
4.1. “Start Small”: Proper Timing, Pilot Testing, and Consistency 
 
The purok system in San Francisco did not see success overnight. It 
underwent several pilot runs starting with just three communities 
(located close to the town proper) in its first few months of 
implementation before expanding to all 15 barangays. And only after 
three years of operation did the town council accord the purok legal 
status as a partner people’s organization. Mayor Alfredo Arquillano, Jr. 
and purok coordinator Leoli Ortadilla emphasized that it took them 
years to establish a workable system. The first five years proved crucial 
in communicating, establishing trust, and building relationships with the 
communities. Consistency was also a key factor since once contact was 
made with residents, constant follow-ups were conducted. Likewise, the 
basic idea that puroks should be voluntary, self-sufficient, and non-
reliant on government handouts was consistently emphasized at every 
stage of implementation. In timing, Mayor Arquillano set up the system 
after winning a second term in 2004. By the time he was up for re-
election in 2007, the system had begun to take root. By that time, 
immediate results appeared from the community-based nutrition 
program. Today, the town has 128 active puroks. 
 
4.2. Organizing according to Geography and Engagement with Barangays 
 
The challenge of geographic access on an island municipality like 
San Francisco, where houses are widely spread apart, proved to be an 
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opportunity as well. The purok system was created to incorporate as 
many homes in close geographic proximity. Though the barangay by 
legal definition is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines, its 
insufficient scope failed to reach all its members. Additionally, 
barangays also had autonomy to a degree from the municipal 
government, so a prudent decision was made to first approach the 
barangay chairmen and council members before expanding the purok 
system to their respective jurisdictions. Though purok coordinators 
answered directly to the mayor, barangay councilors were encouraged to 
oversee specific puroks. Moreover, the coordinators made it clear that 
the puroks were civic organizations patterned after the barangay and not 
a new bureaucratic layer to replace it. As an organization, a purok had a 
certain level of autonomy empowering its members and officers to draft 
rules and even levy fines on their own. Its organizational structure was 
such that communities, through the purok, could replicate barangay 
committees to complement and even augment personnel at the barangay 
level. Clear delineation of tasks and expectations was also made. Purok 
coordinators were municipal-level officials who ensured that the system 
would run smoothly. Barangay officials were free to engage with the 
puroks, and the puroks had to demonstrate their own effort and initiative. 
The combination of top-down introduction and bottom-up 
implementation was a key factor to secure the system’s sustainability. 
Gradual expansion also provided necessary trial and error to sort out 
conflicts that arose in the early stages of implementation, as 
stakeholders from puroks up to the mayor himself learned by doing. 
 
4.3. Learning by Doing:  
Immediate Results Derived from Need-based Deliverables    
 
The purok system has evolved from a solid waste management 
project to a mechanism for reducing and managing disaster risk. The 
system’s evolution was based largely on the needs of the communities 
involved. The purok organization had the leeway to identify specific 
needs of residents, be it livelihood or basic infrastructure. In the 
system’s early years, health and jobs were important for the people, and 
so these needs were negotiated with priorities the area government 
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might have had. Through the initial community-based health delivery 
system and the work-for-food program, a significant decrease was seen 
in malnutrition and poverty. This showed that the capacity-building 
intervention of the purok system—and not merely the receipt of relief or 
monetary aid—effectively made residents more receptive to programs 
that came later like disaster risk reduction and management. Domestic 
and international competitions such as the Clean and Green Award, 
Model LGU Award, and the UNISDR Resilience Award also enhanced 
the competitive spirit of public servants and communities. These awards 
provided set criteria that also served to measure output and outcomes. 
The cash prizes received by the town as a whole were used to fund 
awards for inter-purok competitions. San Francisco had a reputation to 
live up to, and this competitiveness spread to the puroks. When external 
regulations appeared like the NDRRM Law, the town was flexible 
enough to immediately make the transition toward the new law’s 
requirements and mandates. Though the anti-disaster risk system had 
been introduced earlier to San Francisco, the impetus of enforcing legal 
mandates meant that the town had to relearn and re-angle while 
simultaneously introducing new items to disaster risk reduction and 
management planning (such as the creation of the MDRRMO and the 
drafting of a local five-year plan). By the time Typhoon Haiyan had hit, 
the purok system had been in place for almost 10 years. 
 
4.4. “Think Big”: Cooperation beyond San Francisco 
 
San Francisco was generally more receptive to new ideas, welcoming 
partnerships and cooperation with civil society especially in capacity 
building and training. The relationship with Plan International Philippines, 
for example, was based on mutual understanding on empowering 
communities and not simply about receipt of aid. When disaster risk 
reduction and management was introduced to San Francisco in 2008, the 
town leadership insisted that a livelihood component be added to it. Alfredo 
Arquillano, Jr. admitted that prior to this interaction, he as mayor had 
focused little on disaster preparedness and risk management due to the 
more pressing need to ensure jobs for residents. The relationship built over 
the years through other projects allowed smooth cooperation, and to a 
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certain extent, negotiations with civic group partners so that one party did 
not fully dictate things on the other. Such a civil society network allowed 
opportunities to emerge for the municipality to learn from benchmarks 
abroad. When the town won the UNISDR Resilience Award, former mayor 
Arquillano became one of its “resilience champions” and shared the purok’s 
ideas with other LGUs in the Philippines. Even purok coordinators were 
given the chance to share their experiences with other LGU officers. 
 
 
5. Implications for Science of Delivery 
 
The case study of San Francisco in the Philippines shows that disaster 
risk reduction and management based on communities encompass other 
priorities such as health and jobs. Community-based programs must focus 
on the community itself through a combination of top-down capacity 
building by government and bottom-up implementation at the grassroots 
level. This means that residents should receive a certain level of autonomy 
to gradually develop the system on their own, while at the same time 
ensuring accountability from their local government, which likewise plays a 
crucial role in setting clear and measurable objectives and following 
through on the results. San Francisco is also a prime example of what can 
be achieved when preparation meets opportunity. The town government, 
through learning by doing over the years and forming relations with NGO 
partners, introduced preventive disaster measures even before their 
adoption at the national level through legislation. It had a slight head start in 
such measures, and this was crucial in setting up the system that eventually 
saved thousands of lives, whereas similarly situated local governments 
were ill-equipped to handle such a natural disaster. 
 
As a concept, the purok can be found in other areas of the Philippines 
but San Francisco is one of the few documented cases in which this 
system has been effective for disaster risk reduction and management, 
with proven results and outcomes. That said, even the officers and 
coordinators involved have said LGUs, especially those in Cebu 
Province, have tried but failed to adopt the system due to lack of sustained 
effort. In the case of San Francisco, the relationship between the mayor and 
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purok coordinators proved critical. Since the implementation of the purok 
system, only the Arquillano brothers (and their political allies) have been 
elected in San Francisco. What is uncertain, however, is if such 
coordinators would have the same level of enthusiasm in the event of a 
change in leadership. The purok system is considered a prime source of 
political support for the Arquillano camp. But because the purok has been 
institutionalized through ordinances and in planning conducted by 
departments under the town government, the system could also see 
sustainability regardless of political outcomes. 
 
Officials also admit that data recording and knowledge management 
have only begun recently, with most documentation started as the town was 
preparing its nomination submissions for a host of awards. To their credit, 
the townsfolk took the initiative to improve their documentation on their 
own since more researchers and media representatives visited San 
Francisco to learn about the purok-based system of disaster risk reduction 
and management. In 2014, the town was also one of the country’s first 
LGUs to adopt a local climate change adaptation plan (LCCAP) on 
securing long-term funding from the national Climate Change Commission 
to build resilience in towns. The MDRRMO also hired its own policy and 
research officer and photographer in charge of keeping documents and 
storing pertinent data. Like many LGUs in the Philippines, however, a lack 
of quantitative municipal- and barangay-level data remains, and this is 
hurting regional development planning. 
 
Finally, the spread of the purok system or similar community-based 
governance to other parts of the country has proven difficult, despite a strong 
history of support for decentralization reform. San Francisco can credit the 
purok system for strengthening its social integration by emphasizing 
volunteerism and community cooperation, but such intervention was initiated, 
and to a certain extent sustained, from the top-down by the town government 
(Matthies, 2017). A number of leaders, even at the national level, could 
introduce similarly bold policy proposals, but few can allow grassroots 
initiatives to grow autonomously and make the process truly participatory. 
Thus San Francisco residents deserve credit for the success of their purok 
system.  
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▌ Annexes ▌  
Annex A. Hazard Map of San Francisco 
 
Source: MDRRMO-San Francisco 
 
Annex B. List of Barangays & Active Puroks in San Francisco (as of October 2017) 
CENTRAL DISTRICT (39 puroks) 
CAMPO (11) 
1. Acacia 
2. Boho 
3. Buak 
4. Canuchie 
5. Ibabao I 
6. Ibabao II 
7. Kinyawan 
8. Lower Lawis 
9. Mahayahay 
10. Proper 
11. Upper Lawis 
MONTE 
ALEGRE (8) 
1. Bongaw 
2. East 
3. Kangganay 
4. Kuampang 
5. Ob-Ob 
6. Talisay 
7. Tambis 
8. West 
NORTHERN 
POBLACION (7) 
1. Bokok 
2. Calinao 
5. Matnog 
6. Pamatasan 
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3. Lungke 
4. Mangga 
7. Tugas 
SOUTHERN 
POBLACION (6) 
1. Buwawan 
2. Camao 
3. Can-Ising 
4. Magay 
5. Puertobillo 
6. St. Francis 
WESTERN 
POBLACION (7) 
1. Cabbcage 
2. Corva 
3. Danao 
4. Magcapatag I 
5. Magcapatag II 
6. Mangga 
7. Upper Magcarongao 
NORTHERN DISTRICT (39 puroks) 
CABUNGA-AN 
(7) 
1. Batang 
2. Binongbong I 
3. Binongbong II 
4. Proper I 
5. Proper II 
6. Timobo 
7. Ubos 
ESPERANZA (10) 
1. Cogon 
2. Egot 
3. Ibabao 
4. Looc 
5. Lower Tulang 
6. Po 
7. Proper 
8. Taliwambas 
9. Tulang Diot 
10. Upper Tulang 
SANTA CRUZ (8) 
1. Cambat-an I 
2. Cambat-an II 
3. Canlayog 
4. Kangguit 
5. Leong 
6. Matnog 
7. Panhay 
8. Proper 
SONOG (7) 
1. Bastian 
2. Casyo 
3. Esyong 
4. Mahayahay 
5. Matab-ang 
6. Pagnahi-an 
7. Pantalan 
UNION (7) 
1. Cantuwak 
2. Dayang 
3. Lebo 
4. Lower Bontod 
5. Malbago 
6. Nagub-an 
7. Patabog 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT (50 puroks) 
CONSUELO (15) 
1. Bogo I 
2. Bogo II 
3. Boundary 
4. Corva 
5. Danawan 
6. Kolo 
7. Langob 
8. Locbon 
9. Mangkahilo I 
10. Mangkahilo II 
11. Pay-Pay 
12. Proper 
13. Tabay Lawom 
14. Timba-on 
15. Tulay 
HIMENSULAN 
(10) 
1. Bakhao 
2. Ibabao 
3. Kamanggahan 
4. Lower 
Himangkungan 
5. Lower 
Mangodlong 
6. Palamas 
7. Proper 
8. Sagui 
9. Sitio Lhuiller 
10. Upper Mangodlong 
SAN ISIDRO (9) 1. Acacia 6. Canlosong 
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2. Awihao 
3. Bagacay 
4. Baring 
5. Campakong 
7. Dumalerio 
8. Mahaba 
9. San Martin 
SANTIAGO (9) 
1. Bangkal 
2. Calas-agan 
3. Dapdap 
4. Himangkungan 
5. Himangkungan 
II 
6. Kauswagan 
7. Pagnahi-an 
8. Songkayao 
9. Upper 
UNIDOS (8) 
1. Ma-abi-abihon 
2. Mahagala-on 
3. Malagaron 
4. Malipayon 
5. Makugihon 
6. Masinabtanun 
7. Matinabanganon 
Source: LGU-San Francisco 
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Annex C. Timeline of Key Inflection Points 
Period Internal & External Events Legislation/Policy Justification for Inclusion 
1980s-90s 
Major natural disasters hit the 
Philippines, including the eruption of 
Mount Pinatubo and lahar floods. 
 
In San Francisco, Typhoon Bising 
destroy the municipal town hall in 
1982. Typhoon Ruping kills six 
fishermen trying to secure their boats 
in 1990. 
The National Disaster 
Coordinating Council (NDCC) 
implements a “disaster 
management” paradigm on a top-
down basis from the national to 
the local government level. 
Disaster management emerges as 
the prevailing approach in the 
Philippines. 
 
Bising and Ruping are the 
strongest typhoons to have hit San 
Francisco at the time. A 
permanent marker commemorates 
the onslaught of Bising. 
2000s 
Plan International Philippines begins 
to implement community-based 
projects on the Camotes Islands. 
 
The NGO has had a long-
established presence on the 
islands. 
Establishing Purok System (2004-08) 
 
2004 
Alfredo Arquillano, Jr. is reelected for 
a second term as mayor. He wants to 
focus on developing San Francisco as 
an eco-tourism destination but 
complains of problems such as lack 
of proper management of solid waste. 
The purok system is introduced 
to organize residents to clean 
their own backyards as a 
community. 
Communities begin to be 
organized into the sub-level purok 
system. 
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2005-07 
Through coordinators, the purok 
system is expanded to cover all 15 
barangays in San Francisco. 
Community health and work-for-
food programs are introduced at 
the purok-level with the help of 
Plan International Philippines. 
 
In 2007, the municipal council 
passes an ordinance granting 
legal status to the purok as a 
recognized people’s organization 
to serve as community service 
units supporting the barangay. 
Malnutrition begins to decline as 
purok enrollment rises. 
 
The puroks gain initial funding 
from the town government for 
their capital build-up (CBU), 
which they use to build their own 
meeting halls, hold meetings, and 
raise additional funds on their 
own. This is over the system’s 
crucial “learning-by-doing” 
period. 
In the neighboring province of 
Southern Leyte, a landslide covers an 
entire village, killing at least 1,000 
people. 
 
Plan International Philippines, 
which also operates in Southern 
Leyte, adds disaster relief as a 
core competency. 
Introducing Disaster Risk Management in San Francisco (2008-11) 
2008 
The Disaster Risk Reduction Network 
Philippines (DRRNetPhils), an 
umbrella organization, is formed to 
lobby for the passage of a 
comprehensive National Disaster 
The NDCC, through the Office 
of Civil Defense (OCD), begins 
shifting toward a “risk 
reduction” paradigm, including 
disaster preparedness and 
Disaster risk reduction starts to 
gain prominence in the 
Philippines. 
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Risk Reduction and Management 
(NDRRM) Law. 
mitigation, but lacks the structure 
for proper implementation. 
Plan International opens its Camotes 
Islands unit to promote disaster risk 
reduction in San Francisco and 
neighboring municipalities. 
 
The LGU of San Francisco forms 
a partnership with Plan 
International Philippines to 
introduce community-based 
disaster risk reduction at the 
purok level, but with a livelihood 
component. 
2009-2010 
Two major typhoons, Ondoy and 
Pepeng, strike Luzon killing more 
than 1,000 people and immobilizing 
the Philippine capital region of Metro 
Manila, which is submerged in 
floodwaters. 
The Philippine Climate Change 
Act is passed in 2009, followed 
by the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management 
(NDRRM) Act in 2010, 
mandating bottom-up grassroots 
efforts toward disaster risk 
reduction and management. 
The NDRRM Law mandates that 
70 percent of a municipality’s 
budget go to disaster risk 
reduction and preparation and 
the remaining 30 percent to 
quick response to a disaster, 
among other requirements. 
2010-2011 
San Francisco sends a nomination and 
eventually wins the Sasakawa Award 
for Disaster Reduction from the 
UNISDR. 
San Francisco drafts a five-year 
plan for local disaster risk 
reduction and management. 
With support from Plan 
International Philippines, San 
Francisco gets a head start in 
disaster risk reduction and 
management planning, using the 
UNISDR check-list, while at the San Francisco sets up a municipal 
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disaster risk reduction and 
management office (MDRRMO) 
under law.  
same time ensuring compliance 
with requirements set by the new 
law (especially in funding and 
auditing). 
 
San Francisco is honored as a 
“resilient city” and former mayor 
Alfredo Arquillano, Jr. (then vice 
mayor) is named “resilience 
champion.” 
Introducing Disaster Risk Management in San Francisco (2008-11) 
2011-13 
San Francisco begins implementation 
of five-year plan on local disaster risk 
reduction and management.  
 
MDRRMO helps set up barangay 
councils to prepare for disasters, 
while providing capacity building 
down to the purok level. 
 
Education and awareness 
campaigns spread to schools, 
incorporating evacuation drills, 
training of personnel for weather 
forecasting, and investing in 
infrastructure such as Wi-Fi at the 
town hall.  
November 
2013 
Typhoon Haiyan strikes.  
San Francisco suffers no 
casualties in the typhoon. 
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Annex D. List of Interviewees 
Alfredo Arquillano, 
Jr. 
Mayor (2001-10), Vice Mayor (2010-13, 2015-present), 
Municipality of San Francisco 
Rosalinda C. Serion 
Head of Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Office,  
Municipality of San Francisco 
Monica P. Tan 
Research and Planning Officer, MDRRMO,  
Municipality of San Francisco 
Leoli A. Ortadilla Overall Purok Coordinator, Municipality of San Francisco 
Judith V. 
Montalban 
Purok President, Tulang Diyot, Barangay Esperanza 
Arelia E. Alao Purok Vice President, Tulang Diyot, Barangay Esperanza 
Jean B. Tapales Purok Secretary, Tulang Diyot, Barangay Esperanza 
Happy V. Luchavez Adviser, Tulang Diyot, Barangay Esperanza 
Grace A. Maurillo 
Infrastructure Committee Chairwoman, Tulang Diyot, 
Barangay Esperanza 
Janeth M. Bensig 
Peace & Order Committee Chairwoman, Tulang Diyot,  
Barangay Esperanza 
Genela G. Amancio Resident, Tulang Diyot, Barangay Esperanza 
Roy C. Soledad 
Former Manager, Camotes Program Unit,  
Plan International Philippines (2008-11) 
Head, Cebu Investment and Promotions Office,  
Provincial Government of Cebu (present) 
Rizajoy A. 
Hernandez 
Training Officer, Office of Civil Defense, Region VII 
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Annex E. Stakeholder Map 
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Annex F. Process Map  
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CHAPTER 4 
Indian Railway’s Civic Engagement Mechanism  
for Enhancing Customer Service and Responsiveness 
 
By 
Gopal Singh Bhati1 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 Indian Railway (IR), as one of the world’s largest railways, deals 
with a massive number of passenger demands. To upgrade its customer 
service, IR adopted a social media-based civil engagement system 
through which passengers and IR staff can communicate in pursuit of 
better service. The new idea alone, however, made no difference in the 
process of implementation. Using social media as an unprecedented 
communication channel, IR gradually learned by doing. Undergoing a 
multi-stage implementation process, IR developed its revolutionary 
social media-based service by transforming a manual, haphazard, and 
mechanistic model into an automated, sophisticated, and organic one. 
Through painful trial and error, the new customer relations management 
(CRM) system turned out to effectively improve internal operations, 
external accountability, and most importantly, customer trust. 
                                            
1 Gopal Singh Bhati is a graduate student at the KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management. He is an Indian Railway (IR) Personnel Service official who has 
worked for IR over the past 11 years, mostly in delivery of transportation service. His 
areas of interest are organizational management and transformational leadership. He 
is studying the potential effects of digital disruption on public service delivery. The 
digital edge can help raise the level of effective monitoring and widen outreach. Bhati 
is firm believer in empowering citizens under a true democratic spirit for attaining the 
objective of good governance. 
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1. Background and Challenges 
 
 IR, owned and managed by the Ministry of Railways and often 
called India’s lifeline, is one of the world’s largest railway networks. It 
spans 115,000 km of track over a route 67,312 km long and comprising 
7,112 stations.  
 
 With an estimated 1.4 million employees and revenue of nearly INR 
2 trillion, IR is the world’s eighth-largest organization. It serves 23 
million users daily by operating thousands of services, and hauls more 
than 1.2 billion tons of freight every year. The problems confronting IR 
were huge because of the big gap between passenger expectations and 
the state-run corporation’s responsiveness. 
 
1.1. Development Challenges 
 
 IR has a wide diversity of passengers. To cater to a wide range of 
customer needs, IR offers various classes of passenger service and trains, 
making it extremely challenging to meet customer expectations. 
Passenger dissatisfaction frequently leads to complaints, but IR is 
known to enjoy high customer ratings even among constantly 
complaining passengers. The Indian railways minister realized that the 
challenge of achieving customer satisfaction required innovative 
solutions. He selected social media to help the company meet the varied 
expectations of passengers. 
 
 Traditionally, rail passengers have expressed their grievances 
through conventional means such as letters, email, and phone calls. In 
the recent past, the Centralized Public Grievance Redress and 
Monitoring Management System (CPGRAMS), the portal of the Indian 
government, and the Complaint Management System (COMS), the 
portal of Indian Railways, were introduced for handling complaints 
from rail passengers and users and the general public. IR uses social 
media platforms to provide immediate assistance to rail passengers 
based on tweets received on the ministry’s Twitter handles. This method 
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has been found to be more effective and passengers receive assistance in 
real time. 
 
1.2. Initial Intervention and Delivery Challenges 
 
 To resolve IR’s dilemma, newly appointed Railway Minister Suresh 
Prabhu in November 2014 started a long journey to revamp the 
organization. He initiated a new approach to customer service using 
social media. Ved Prakash, the ministry’s director for information and 
publicity, recalled his boss this way: “This system of social media came 
into existence unintentionally. We were already using two mechanisms 
in customer grievance in the form of an all-India toll-free number and a 
manual system of registration at each station. We never thought beyond 
this as our system was working stably. Sometime in 2015, a train 
passenger tweeted to the minister’s personal Twitter handle about a 
railway irregularity. The minister took a different perspective on this, 
realizing that the present system had limitations. The gap between 
passenger expectations and service quality had to be filled. He came up 
with the idea of incorporating Twitter as tool for solving problems and 
reaching out to our customers. Twitter was user friendly and could 
respond instantly, thus it was visible and tangible. This is how Twitter 
Seva born in IR.” 
 
 To improve the passenger experience, IR introduced social media 
platforms like the Twitter handle of the Ministry of Railways 
(@RailMinIndia), as well as those of all general and divisional IR 
managers to assist passengers in real time and handle their grievances 
24-7. Passengers also shared their experiences and gave suggestions 
through this method.  
 
 To manage the issues being raised on social media by general and 
traveling passengers, IR uses an IT-enabled tool through social customer 
relationship management (social CRM). An average of 18,000 tweets 
are received. The immediate actionable tweets of passengers either on 
running trains or at stations are forwarded to the officials concerned; the 
tweets are normally read and answered within the shortest possible time. 
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Quick and prompt assistance to passengers through social media have 
rapidly popularized the ministry’s Twitter handle (@RailMinIndia). The 
ministry achieved the milestone of one million followers on April 27, 
2016, and doubled that mark on March 29, 2017. 
 
 Taking the first step toward opening the innovative social-media-
based service did encounter bumps. Manually handling the massive 
number of tweets was incredibly difficult at first, and the Twitter-fueled 
solution alone did not help resolve operational details. Nobody at IR had 
any idea of how many tweets were being managed or how many needed 
responses or resolution. Let alone the real-time resolutions, generating 
insight and MIS reports was hardly possible. 
 
 The tweets were manually screened among the barrage that arrived 
to assist passengers. This process resulted in many tweets being ignored. 
Back then, IR also had no accountability from agents, no quality checks, 
and no collaboration among staff on cases. Staff used the primitive 
practice of using registers to take note of the few tweets they could 
respond to in one day. While working on these tweets, no studies could 
be generated such as the number of complaints, suggestions, or 
feedback, the types of issues, or which division or zone they pertained 
to. Going back and searching through or filtering these tweets were 
impossible; just flipping a register’s pages was the only way to look at 
records. Staff had to manually update the nature of an issue and the IR 
department’s zone and division to which the issue pertained to. They 
also had to identify an issue’s urgency and type. Accountability was 
non-existent at the time. All these factors greatly hampered staff 
efficiency and only a handful of issues could be handled. 
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▌Figure 4-1 ▌ Basic Workflow of Twitter Seva 
Note: Timeline 
- July. 4. 2014: Twitter handle @RailMinIndia created 
- Dec. 3. 2015: Customer complaint management cell set up  to monitor complaints on social media. 
- June.15. 2016: Integration of social media for complaint management. 
- Aug.1. 2016: Twitter handle of Minister of Railways integrated with complaint management 
- April. 27. 2016: Twitter handle of Ministry of Railways (@RailMinIndia) reaches milestone of one million 
followers 
- Dec. 11. 2016: Twitter handle of Ministry of Railways (@RailMinIndia) breaks follower mark of two million 
- March. 29. 2017: Twitter handle of Ministry of Railways (@RailMinIndia) hits 2.5 million followers 
Source: IR internal documents  
 
 
2. Tracing the Implementation Process 
 
2.1. Phase 1: Institutionalization of Proactive Intervention 
 
 Passengers did not demand that IR use social media to handle 
complaints; the railway minister started this initiative. Following the 
top-down form of proactive intervention, the rail authority’s 
organizational structure and process underwent institutionalization to 
see the idea through. 
 
 To begin with, the minister made Director Praksh in charge of 
handling tweets. “It all started at my 10X10-feet chamber as an 
additional duty. I wasn’t sure how I was going to do as it was blind 
game plan with no experience. I was asked to set up some basic 
infrastructure and we bought two iPads. I used to scan all the tweets in 
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bits and pieces along with doing my major duty of circulating 
information and broadcasting the railway’s regular work to the media. 
Sometimes I couldn’t see the tweets, sometimes the minister replied 
directly, and sometimes he sent me short messages on technically tricky 
complaints; to balance time, I’d personally look and reply.” 
 
 This initial system was an incredibly raw exchange of information in 
which either IR replied to passenger grievances centrally or sent them to 
field units or zones for resolution. More manual and discretionary in 
nature, the system was just a reflection of how directors and the minister 
treated the issue. No prioritization and consistency also meant the lack 
of a systematic approach. The Twitter wall was getting input day and 
night but the responders worked on it by day only with no continuum. 
Sometimes they missed important issues and sometimes they spent too 
much time on minor ones. 
 
 Prakash said, “It was just a two-man show, we were both actor and 
producer-director. Due to destiny, whatever quantum we spent on 
Twitter mode, it generated multifold responses from users. It started 
with manageable double digits and touched three-digit tweets within the 
span of a few months. I’m not sure what this increase in number reflects, 
whether we were on the right track or the existing system was not as 
successful as we believed. But this additional path created a ray of hope 
as an effective mode of communication between us, which had been 
missing for ages. To handle this heightened activity, we needed a team 
and structure to the whole process.” 
 
 In this situation, the Ministry of Railways started streamlining the 
process, and the Twitter cell was created in December 2015. They 
selected several computer operators from the railway system and started 
with five people and one counter. Put under the control of the IR 
executive director for public grievances, the counter operated in two 
shifts: 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. and 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. A separate Twitter handle 
(@RailMinIndia) different from the minister’s personal handle was set 
up by Director Prakash . All 16 zone and 64 division heads of IR each 
got their own Twitter handles. 
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2.2. Phase 2: Expanded Institutionalization of External Services 
 
 The initial organizational reform focused on structure and process to 
operate customer service based on social media, and was just the first 
step toward enhancing customer responsiveness. Expansion of 
institutionalization provided constant support. 
 
 A Ms. Anchal, one of the initial staff members for customer service 
under the new system, said “In the initial days, we tried to capture all 
tweets that came in from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. We were always confused 
over how to assign them priority as we had no railway managerial 
experience. To us, all tweets seemed important. Then we discussed this 
issue with the new executive director, Ravinesh Kumar, and narrowed 
our focus to actionable tasks needed in an emergency and for deficient 
passenger amenities. I remember in the initial days a medical emergency 
reported in a tweet. A passenger’s health deteriorated while he was en 
route to his destination.”  
 
 “We immediately got his location and sent this information to the 
nearest zonal center via Twitter and phone. We arranged a medical team 
to be at the next station and medication was provided. The passenger 
tweeted us back on our work, which made me feel proud and happy. We 
did something good. These series of problem-solving tasks consisted of 
cleaning the train to smoke detection underneath, arranging milk for an 
infant, getting a wheelchair to a paralyzed person, finding a missing kid, 
and protecting a woman from sexual assault.” 
 
 Still, the new system at this phase faced the following limitations: 
 
(1) This model responded to few tweets. Though responders tried to 
capture tweets from the time window of 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., most 
long-distance trains ran at night. Thus many important requests 
went missing from this time window. 
 
(2) This system was mechanical in nature as scanning and processing 
all requests depended on staff efficiency along with Twitter 
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traffic at that instant. Important aspects were occasionally left out 
because of human negligence. 
 
(3) Twitter has a specific format in which all tweets add up on the 
wall, making it extremely cumbersome to manually identify the 
main tweets and follow-ups. 
 
(4) The massive traffic of tweets (thousands per day) made their 
handling by a single counter a herculean task. 
 
 A Mr. Rajesh, a member of the Twitter cell, said about the early 
version of the customer service system based on social media, “We were 
initially very happy with the Twitter cell being an organized unit but got 
confused over whether the increased number of tweets reflected 
people’s growing expectations or the failure of our working system 
regardless of our efforts. We faced huge media criticism on two fronts. 
First, the tweets that went unattended and unresolved earned us the tag 
of ‘information passers’ and a discretionary attitude. We received 
sarcastic comments like ‘When the minister wants us to, we’ll act, 
otherwise it’s the ‘chalta hai’ (status quo) approach. Second, our 
unskilled staff’s response to retweets seemed machine generated and 
lacked a human touch. Our response lacked courtesy, empathy, and 
sensitivity. We became like a regular answering machine.” 
 
▌Figure 4-2 ▌ Twitter Seva Procedure (Original Model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In response to the problems mentioned above, Executive Director of 
Public Grievances Ravinesh Kumar took it as a new challenge and had 
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this system revamped by August 2016. The additional initiative IR 
adopted is as follows: 
 
(1) They made it a cell to work around the clock. This step solved the 
problem of missed tweets when staff were not on duty. That 
someone would be watching was assured. 
 
(2) The number of counters was raised to seven but this time, IR 
outsourced the work to tech-savvy specialists with more training 
in communication skills and effective response ability. 
 
(3) All zonal railways were ordered to set up their own Twitter cells 
and put their handles to effective use. Becoming a more self-
sustaining system, such railways had to watch their pending 
tweets and resolve them accordingly. 
 
2.3. Phase 3: Smart Institutionalization of Internal Cooperation 
 
 The expanded institutionalization of organizational hardware needed 
support from more sophisticated software. Executive Director Kumar 
said, “This new system created one peculiar problem as we were unable 
to detect whether more than one counter was working on same tweet 
issue. This overlap hampered our productivity. Still, we faced the 
problem of lost tweets due to manual tracking in times of higher traffic. 
There was no closing mechanism. This uncertainty was persistent. We 
couldn’t perform effective monitoring until now, we’d adopted the 
convention of treating as a close if a retweet from a zone was found. 
There was neither a timeframe to close a pending request nor a system 
to monitor it.” 
 
 To resolve these new challenges, a new tool for social customer 
relationship management (social CRM) was developed. The tool had the 
following unique advantages to overcome earlier drawbacks: 
 
(1) Ensured effective capture of relevant tweets and posts based on a 
set of keywords (a query) fed into the system, created them into 
individual tickets and helped officials collaborate on the tools to 
get the best results from the exerted efforts  
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(2) Utilized the unique property of Twitter’s 140-word limit in 
identifying request type, helping prioritization. After capturing 
the tweets or posts based on keywords in the query, the system’s 
robust natural language processing (NPL) engine first looked at a 
tweet’s sentiments and marked it as “positive,” “negative,” or 
“neutral.” Then the official opened the ticket and read the tweet. 
Depending on if a ticketed tweet required any action from 
railways, the agents and staff also marked it an “actionable” or 
“non-actionable” ticket. The system prioritized a post as 
“normal,” “high,” or “urgent” based on the keywords fed to the 
system and also through system learning. A list of words in 
software was created like “help,” “urgent,” and “emergency” for 
top priority, speeding up their working speed in dealing with 
thousands of tweets per day without missing anyone. All cases 
were classified into three priority groups: top, medium, and low. 
This software scanned all tweets and assigned priority depending 
on each category of the word list. 
 
(3) This system worked via round-robin scheduling. Each counter 
was assigned individual tweets along with a recording counter ID 
for each tweet, resolving the overlap problem. All tweets thus 
had a traceable format. 
 
(4) This tool helped them create a token number for each assigned 
tweet. Each number also had a timer system to help track 
pending requests. 
 
(5) This CRM tool helped create a summary sheet of various flexible 
modules for use in monitoring and tracking each request status. 
One feature was to record the information in customized form. 
This allowed problematic areas to be identified by the respective 
departmental authorities, which enabled them to improvise to 
improve the delivery of services. 
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(6) This monitoring via statistical parameters among railway zones 
created sensitivity and a performance indicator. 
 
▌Figure 4-3 ▌ Twitter Seva Procedure (updated model) Flow Chart 
Source: IR internal documents  
 
 
3. Impact and Prospects 
 
3.1. Internal Management  
 
 Thanks to social CRM, the Ministry of Railways can generate 
useful insights through reports on management information systems. 
These reports, geographical and functional, further help find key 
areas that need attention and system improvement. The sharing of 
such reports with department and location heads on a weekly, bi-
weekly, and monthly basis boosts effective monitoring of customer 
tweets. 
 
▌Table 4-1 ▌ Comparison of Major Features of Twitter Seva System:  
Past vs. Present 
 Past Present 
Management  
Information System (MIS) Manually operated Fully automated 
Work flow Undefined Automatically assigned 
Case tracking No tracking Auto filtering 
Cases missed Frequent Almost none 
Response time Very long 200% improvement 
Source: IR internal documents  
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▌Figure 4-4 ▌ Actionable Ticket Types (April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017) 
Source: IR internal documents  
 
▌Figure 4-5 ▌ Breakdown of Tickets by Department 
(April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017) 
Source: IR internal documents  
 
 This exercise helped IR analyze flaws and areas to focus on providing 
better service, and served as a barometer to check performance in reference 
to the desired outcome. Statistics for 2016-17 showed that railways needed 
to focus more on coaching, mechanical, and commercial issues that 
ultimately affected passengers. This mechanism put citizens at the forefront 
of auditing and reviewing the Ministry of Railways’ performance. 
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3.2. External Accountability 
 
 All activities involved in receiving complaints, forwarding them to the 
authority concerned and relevant senior officials, taking action, and getting 
feedback from passengers are within the public domain. The tweets 
forwarded to the rail authority and the latter’s actions taken automatically get 
recorded in the system and can be retrieved for reference to ensure full 
accountability. This system has consistently shown examples of social 
auditing, where complaints on any delay or inaction on the part of any 
authority results in corrective gesture or action by the authority in charge. The 
general public has also shared tweets and posts viasocial media on alleged 
corruption by uploading videos and photos. These immediately grab the 
attention of authorities and the proper actions are taken. Thus this system has 
been proven to deter staff from committing corruption. 
 
3.3. Civil Engagement and Trust 
 
 This effective system created the concept among citizens of the 
“power of tweets.” In the hands of the people, this tool has made 
them collaborative partners in effective service delivery. Citizens 
have utilized tweets for proactively getting the government’s 
attention on a topic, discussing and analyzing government 
initiatives, and finally empowering the people to achieve the 
ultimate objective of good governance in a democracy. Such power 
has been applauded by both the media and general public for doing 
a public service. The following are a few examples: 
 
• Crisis management: Acting on a passenger’s tweet, people 
trapped in a train after an accident were rescued. 
• Civic participation: Passenger amenities were relocated per a 
citizen’s suggestion; IR had earlier failed to effectively utilize 
tweets to improve service. 
• Good governance: Promptly acting and resolving complaints 
and ensuring accountability from public officials 
• Transparency: Citizens can seek information and question the 
Ministry of Railways over its actions. Everything is transparent 
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to everyone. 
• Real-time resolution: Ensures public’s trust in the government 
to give the feeling “We are heard” 
 
▌Figure 4-6 ▌ Top Issues and Complaints (April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017 
Source: IR internal documents  
 
 As seen in [Figure 6], lack of punctuality and poor hygiene of 
bathrooms were major sources of passenger dissatisfaction. This 
evidence-based management featured passenger monitoring and 
constructive contributions, creating a sense of accountability among 
railway management. In return, IR’s responsiveness raised the public’s 
trust in the government. 
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▌Figure 4-7 ▌ Top Issues by Zone (April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017) 
Source: IR internal documents  
  
 
 
 
▌Figure 4-8 ▌ Top 10 Initial Response Time of Divisions in Minutes  
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( April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017) 
Source: IR internal documents  
  
 The response times of all IR divisions are monitored regularly amid 
heightened scrutiny on social media. This report is considered a key 
performance indicator for a division’s responsiveness. Competition 
among divisions has helped enhance customer service by IR despite its 
status as a government-run corporation.  
 
3.4. Roadmap for the Future 
 
With a multichannel source for customer engagement, a system 
cannot work efficiently without an integrated common platform that 
arranges and monitors communication with customers. The integrated 
dashboard for Twitter, Facebook, Instagram (RailMinIndia), and 
YouTube (Ministry of Railways-India) will be developed and added to 
IR’s complaint management system. 
 
 The next step is to bring all other channels of IR’s complaint 
handling into the integrated dashboard under the same platform, like the 
Complaint Management System (COMS), Centralized Public Grievance 
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Redress and Monitoring Management System (CPGRAMS), and 
helplines. For the benefit of the general public in India, all channels for 
lodging complaints and suggestions will be consolidated into a single 
mobile application. 
 
 
4. Lessons and Implications for the Science of Delivery 
 
 The IR case study shows how the policymaking process for public 
transportation can be analyzed and interpreted from the perspective of 
the science-of-delivery framework. The process consists of multiple 
stages in which IR had to deal with diverse challenges at every phase as 
shown below. (See Annex D for the details.) 
 
[Policy Goal: Voice and Accountability]  
 
 As a public service provider, IR had as its initial reform objective 
enhancement of accountability. The massive volume of passenger 
demands had to be handled in a more comprehensive and systematic 
manner. For that purpose, IR had to listen to customers more carefully. 
 
(1) Policy Leverage at Phase 1: Engagement of Stakeholders using ICT  
 
 The objective of raising responsiveness to passengers was self-
evident for a public corporation. When it came to the method of 
achieving such a goal, however, various courses of action were available. 
IR’s choice was to engage passengers more closely in the management 
process by using information and communications technology (ICT). 
The company decided on a new medium—social media—to allow 
passengers to access IR’s decision-making process more conveniently 
and thereby improve customer service. 
 
(2) Policy Leverage at Phase 2:  
Leadership, Human Resource, Organizational Capacity   
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 Such a revolutionary approach of engaging the people in service 
sector reform would not have been possible without strong initiative 
from the IR leadership. The new railways minister took the lead in 
launching the social media-based system of customer service. And his 
top-down approach eased the allocation of human resources and 
provided the organizational capacity needed for the new service. 
 
(3) Policy Leverage at Phase 3: Roles, Responsiveness and Priority   
 
 Even after the institutionalization of the social media-based system 
of customer service, more steps had to be taken. The new staff, 
technology, and operating procedures required fine-tuning to ensure 
higher efficiency. The redundant and overlapping system was also 
accompanied by many missing gaps in service IR was supposed to fill. 
So the staff and their tasks were reorganized, streamlined, integrated, 
and prioritized. The drive toward implementing sophisticated innovation 
is never ending because the environment surrounding IR is constantly 
changing. 
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▌ Annexes ▌  
Annex A. Interviewees List  
1. Ravinesh Kumar, Executive Director (Public Grievances),  
Railway Board, New Delhi 
2. Ved Praksh, Director (I&B), Railway Board, New Delhi 
3. R. Badrinarayan  
(Divisional Railway Manager, Howrah Division, Eastern Railway) 
4. Team members of social media cell at Railway Board, New Delhi 
 
 
Annex B. List of Sample Keywords in WORD-CLOUD for  
Prioritizing & Categorizing Tweets  
Categories Keywords 
Urgent 
Theft, missing, medical, rape, accident, security, poison, collapsed, 
unconscious, wheelchair, danger, dead, death, fire, harass, urgent, 
serious, 
trouble, terrorist, robbery, serious, drunk, police, first aid, 
emergency, snatch, fainted, derailment, injured, doctor, bleeding, 
hurt, suffer, misbehave, pain, fever 
Security: 
urgent 
Beaten, beggar, rob, lost, theft, stone pelting, hawker, anti-social, 
illegal, stabbing, knife, pistol, murder, dacoit*, robbery, gun, 
passenger missing, luggage lost, extortion, kidnapping, trafficking, 
afraid, suspect, insecure, tease, drugged, railway police 
Medical: 
urgent 
Medical, heart, stomach, headache, pain, blood, vomit, fever, 
oxygen, asthma, attack, patient, medicine, injury, cancer 
High 
priority 
Arthritis, bedroll, birth, cigarette, cockroach, corruption, worried, 
seat, cooling, milk, dirty, air conditioning, clean, fan, disturbance, 
bedsheet, extra charge, no water, no pantry, hot, rat, gandagi* 
Low 
priority 
Punctual, vendor, platform, announcement, attention, staff, 
littering, station, lighting, attention, ticket examiner, no train, 
quality, reservation, shatabdi*, 
Note: Various Hindi words are added either in Hindi or Roman script. 
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Annex C. Detailed Mechanism of New System 
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 Annex D. Process Map (based on taxonomy of delivery challenge) 
Delivery challenge 
taxonomy 
Initial challenge & intervention Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Development 
challenge 
Initial 
intervention Delivery challenge 
Learning & 
adapted 
intervention 
Delivery 
challenge 
Learning & 
adapted 
intervention 
Delivery 
challenge 
Learning & 
adapted 
intervention 
Gap b/w users 
demands & 
services 
Proactive civil 
engagement to 
improve 
services 
• External: 
volume of 
tweets 
• Internal: 
unskilled staff, 
unsystematic 
approach 
Institutionaliza
tion (HR, 
governance & 
system) 
• External: 
diverse 
demands 
 
• Internal: 
costs of 
prioritizati
on 
Expanded 
institutionaliz
ation of 
external 
services 
(more 
seamless, 
decentralized, 
outsourced, & 
standardized 
Twitter 
operation) 
Internal: role 
conflicts 
Smart 
institutionalizati
on of internal 
coordination 
(CRM using pre-
designated 
request 
categories, 
specified 
responsibility) 
Stakeholder         
 
coordination & 
engagement 
        
 
Roles & 
responsibilities   
Confusing division 
of labor   
Seamless 24-
hour system, 
more 
decentralized 
& 
standardized 
Twitter cells 
operation 
Overlapping, 
confusing 
roles 
"Counter tweet" 
match for 
enhancing 
accountability 
Stakeholder 
engagement  
Engaging users 
to improve 
service 
     
User requests 
based on 
predesignated 
categories 
Inter & intra-
governmental   
Confusing, 
competing  
Confusing, 
competing    
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relations priorities priorities 
Commitment & 
leadership 
        
 
Change in 
leadership & 
administration 
 
New minister 
revamps 
organization 
 
New 
governance 
(Executive 
Director of 
Public 
Grievance) 
    
Change in 
priorities or 
lack of 
commitment 
  
Confusing, 
competing 
priorities  
Confusing, 
competing 
priorities   
Simplify & 
systemize user 
request categories 
HR & 
organizational 
capacity 
        
 
Skilled 
personnel   
Unprepared & 
inexperienced staff 
Hiring of 
professional 
computer 
operator 
Unprofessiona
l staff 
Outsourcing 
to ICT-savvy 
personnel 
  
Organizational 
capacity   
Not systematic, but 
manual & 
discretionary 
approach 
Systematic 
approach (team-
based, 
streamlined 
process) 
 
Outsourcing 
to ICT-savvy 
personnel 
  
context         
 
Governance & 
politics 
        
 
People’s’ voice 
& 
accountability 
Huge 
expectations 
of users 
 
Too many tweets 
from users  
Too diverse 
demands from 
users 
   
Basic infrastructure         
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ICT 
 
Proactive 
intervention 
using ICT 
     
New CRM 
Project         
 
Project design         
 
Overambitious 
objectives         
Time allocation 
or task 
sequencing 
  
Confusing priorities 
     
Stakeholder 
selection         
Beneficiary 
targeting     
Excessively 
diverse 
demands from 
users, 
confusing 
priorities 
  
 
 
Project finance         
 
Budgeting 
   
More support to 
Twitter Seva  
More support to 
Twitter Seva   
Auditing 
        
Project data & 
monitoring 
        
 
Indicators 
 
Visible & 
tangible 
indicators thanks 
to ICT 
Confusing 
interpretation of 
indicators 
    
Standardizing user 
request categories 
Data availability 
& baselines        
Standardizing user 
request categories 
Reporting & 
supervision        
Counter tweet 
match for 
enhancing 
accountability 
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CHAPTER 5 
Development of Integrated Security             
for Public Safety in Ecuador 
 
By 
Gustavo Benitez and Daemyeong Kwon1 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
 
Executive Summary 
 
Like quite a few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Ecuador 
has in the past suffered from a high crime rate, especially that of homicides. 
Thanks to a series of government reforms such as a de-concentration policy, 
use of high-tech communication, and setup of national coordinating centers 
for emergency situations that enabled integrated security, the Ecuadorean 
government greatly improved public safety. The homicide rate was reduced 
to five per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016, and Ecuador began to attract major 
attention as a model for successful implementation of integrated security in 
developing countries plagued by violence and crime.   
 
 
 
                                            
1 Gustavo Benitez is a graduate student at the KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management. He has worked for the State Attorney General Office of Ecuador as a 
public attorney for more than 10 years. His colleague Daemyeong Kwon is also a 
graduate student at the KDI school. After graduating summa cum laude from the 
College of International Studies at Kyung Hee University in Korea and working in 
Senegal for a year, Kwon entered the KDI School to study international development 
more in depth.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Democracy returned to Ecuador in 1979 after a long period of 
dictatorship. The country, however, suffered from political instability from 
1997 to 2007 because of the successive removal of presidents. Over this 
ten-year period, none of the nation’s eight presidents completed his four-
year term. The weak government also made it impossible to have an 
adequate organization or a proper system to control and coordinate 
government institutions responsible for public safety. 
 
In addition, the economic crisis of 1998 led to the collapse of 
Ecuadorean financial institutions such as Filanbanco, Préstamos, 
Previsora, and Progreso. This not only weakened the government but 
also led to suffering among the Ecuadorean people. Though the 
economy began to slowly recover after 2000, the homicide rate surged 
from 6.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1980 to 10.4 in 1990 and 14.5 in 
2000. The rate peaked at18.9 in 2008, which made Ecuadoreans distrust 
their government. 
 
Despite the government’s best efforts, the crime rate rose due to 
inefficient cooperation among agencies under each ministry and lack of 
decentralization, de-concentration, and preventive measures. The poor 
intra- and inter-institutional cooperation also led to the misallocation of 
logistical and human resources. Moreover, many government strategies and 
actions were made without geo-referenced data on crimes and the analysis 
of crime hot spots, or areas with especially high crime rates), so citizens 
failed to get timely responses in the face of dangerous situations.  
 
After recognizing the grave crisis in public safety, the government 
under the strong leadership of then President Rafael Correa got to work 
on improving public security, including reducing the murder rate. The 
term “integral security”2 was mentioned in Ecuador’s new constitution 
                                            
2  The term “integral (integrated) security” was introduced in the Ecuadorean 
constitution (Clause 8 of Article 3) in 2008 for the first time and states: “Guaranteeing 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 Development of Integrated Security for Public Safety in Ecuador    125 
for the first time in 2008, and the government started to integrate the 
duties of each government institution3 related to public safety into one 
framework. This allowed actions to be coordinated and focused on 
crime prevention, as well as monitoring at the national and local levels. 
To realize this objective, the role of police in public safety had to be 
distributed to other government institutions.   
 
Stifling this process, however, was strong opposition from police 
groups; a state of emergency was even declared. The government then 
began to implement a series of actions by raising the number of police 
officers in each community, providing cutting-edge equipment to law 
enforcement, creating criminal investigation offices, performing data 
analysis, and finally completing the integral security mechanism 
through which the actions of all institutions were coordinated. This 
allowed the government to offer security services to the public.  
 
Thanks to the de-concentration of public institutions,4 the government 
could better understand the people’s needs and rapidly provide better 
security services. Moreover, the Ecuadorean public also helped raise public 
security by forming civilian-led committees.  
 
An outstanding project under the new security model was Integrated 
Security Service SIS-ECU-911 (Servicio Integrado de Seguriado 
                                                                   
its inhabitants the right to a culture of peace, to integral security and to live in a 
democratic society free of corruption.” 
3 Government institutions for public safety under the integrated security system include 
all related agencies such as the National Police under the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Prosecutor’s Office, courts, and the Public Defender’s Office under the Judiciary 
Council, the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Religious Affairs, the armed 
forces, firefighters, and Red Cross. Integrated security covers all security issues in 
Ecuador and its main goal is to protect the public from all types of threats. This paper, 
however, mainly focuses on how Ecuador reduced crime rates (especially that of 
homicide), a more urgent task in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
4 Decentralization and de-concentration comprise one part of national security planning. De-
centralization implies the transfer of competencies and resources from the central government to 
local governments or institutions, while de-concentration distributes services from institutions 
and installs more offices to get the government closer to citizens. 
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Ecuador 911)” in 2011. This enabled relevant institutions to cooperate in 
providing a rapid response not only to crime, but also other emergencies 
such as natural disasters and accidents. Thus the logistical and human 
resources of each institution could see optimal use through the latest 
technologies and coordinating mechanisms. 
 
SIS-ECU-911 has national coverage and citizens can use the service 
24-7 by just dialing 9-1-1 or pushing the emergency button on a bus or 
taxi or at banks, hotels, and other public or private spaces. Moreover, 
surveillance cameras installed at public spaces across the country allow 
SIS-ECU-911 center staff to keep a constant eye on critical areas (SIS-
ECU-911, 2015). 
 
For example, when a crime in a district is detected by a security 
camera, relevant figures such as police officers or rescue personnel are 
rapidly dispatched under the coordination of the SIS-ECU-911 center. 
Accordingly, Ecuador’s homicide rate began to decline from 2008 and 
fell to five per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016. Considering the severity of 
crime rates in developing economies in Latin America, the success of 
integrated security in Ecuador holds major implications. 
 
1.1. Development Challenges: High Crime Rate Threatens Public Welfare 
 
A leading indicator that gauges a country’s level of violence and 
insecurity is the homicide rate (CHIODA, 2017). In Ecuador between 
1980 and 2008, this figure nearly tripled from 6.4 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants to 18.9 in 2008. Over 60 percent of homicides were 
committed through the use of firearms, and the presence of organized 
crime such as drug trafficking was on the rise with the proliferation of 
criminal organizations (SEMPLADES,5 2013). 
 
                                            
5 SEMPLADES stands for the Ecuadoran Secretariat for Planning and Development in 
English. 
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Daniel Pontón (2009) said, “In summary, since the return to 
democracy in 1979, there have been three facts that we could highlight 
in matters of public security: a) sustained growth in the indicators of 
violence, crime, and citizen security; b) transformation in the 
government’s priority or agenda on security, ranging from the anti-
subversive struggle of the 1980s to the control of drug trafficking and 
related activities from the early 2000s; and c) a recurrent crisis and 
institutional illegitimacy (police, prison, and justice) lacking the public’s 
confidence.”  
 
The rise in violence and public insecurity mainly resulted from the 
central government’s lack of active participation in political decision 
making and failure to act toward improving public security. In addition, 
government institutions related to public safety practiced no cooperation 
and the country lacked technologies and the ability to conduct geo-
referenced data analysis. For these reasons, Ecuadoreans could not receive 
a timely response in a criminal situation and public confidence in public 
institutions was abysmal. The government also did not also encourage the 
people to take part in public security improvement. 
 
Ecuador thus faced several problems in three areas of public security. 
 
• Weak management in government and relevant institutions 
- Management not aiming to achieve results  
(result-oriented actions)  
- Public policy devised separately without data-based decision 
makingPolicy and actions geared toward responses to crime, 
not prevention 
 
• Weakness of technical tools  
- Databases with bad indicators and problems in data reconciliation 
- No interconnectivity in each institution’s systems or databases 
- No data analysis or geo-reference of crime hot spots in system    
 
• Little or no cooperation among institutions and lack of civic 
participation  
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- Limited de-concentration of National Police and other institutions  
- Weak inter-institutional work 
- Weak link between institutions and citizens 
 
▌Figure 5-1 ▌ Homicide Rate in Ecuador (1980-2010) 
Source: The author made this graph based on data from the National Institute of Statistics 
and Census (1980-2000) and National Police of Ecuador (2001-10) 
 
1.1.1. Establishment of New Constitution in 2008 
Until 2008, Ecuador had no legal norms to support the integration of 
public security services, and this was a leading reason behind weak 
cooperation among public safety agencies. Thus the adoption of new 
regulations based on the new constitution, decrees, national and 
institutional plans, and other criteria was needed. In 2007, after the 
successive overthrow of presidents, Rafael Correa took over as chief 
executive and began to implement reform in various sectors. 
  
Bolstering public safety management was a major area for reforms, so a 
new constitution was promulgated in 2008 that included the term “integral 
security” for the first time in Ecuadorian history. Based on this new concept, 
both traditional and non-traditional public institutions began to cooperate 
among themselves by meeting and sharing information and data for one 
mission: provide better public safety. Through joint work on security 
matters, the government also began to focus on preventive measures, which 
were more effective in raising public safety. The presidential cabinet, 
councils, commissions, and committees were created based on the subsequent 
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enactment of laws and decrees. For example, the newly established Public 
Safety Council, comprised the following members: 
 
• President and Vice President 
• President of the National Assembly 
• President of the National Court of Justice 
• Coordinating Minister of Security 
• Minister of National Defense 
• Minister of Justice, Human Rights, and Cults 
• Minister of Foreign Affairs 
• Chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces 
• General Commander of the National Police6 
 
Within this council, the government took several measures including 
a 2009 ban on carrying firearms and strengthening punishment. These 
actions played an important role in reducing crime in Ecuador, leading 
to a decline in the homicide rate (UNODC,7 2014).  
 
The government also devised national plans such as the National Plan 
for Good Living (2009-13), the Project to Transform Justice (2009-13), 
and the Law and Plan on Citizen Security (2009). It decided to gradually 
raise the number of law enforcement officers (national police) more than 
40 percent and build more police stations in each neighborhood across 
the country.  
 
1.1.2. Reformulation of Strategic Plan for Modernization and Integral 
Transformation of National Police (2010-14) 
 
The National Secretariat for Planning and Development 
(SENPLADES), a new public institution for national planning, issued 
the National Plan for Good Living (2009-13). Each public institution 
has since been required to prepare an action plan per SENPLADES 
                                            
6 The Public Safety Council was created per Article 2 of the Public Safety Law. 
7 UNDOC stands for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
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guidelines for outlining the nation’s objectives. Thus the Reforming and 
Strengthening Justice Plan (2009-13) was launched to improve the 
Prosecutor’s Office, Courts, and the Penitentiary System. In addition, 
the National Police of Ecuador had to restructure its previous plan 
(2004-14) and revised its strategic blueprint for modernization and 
comprehensive transformation (2010-14) (National Police, 2010). Over 
this period, the president issued several decrees to reorganize public 
agencies, especially the National Police, and declared a public safety 
emergency. Yet a series of government actions caused many conflicts 
among institutions.  
 
1.2. Delivery Challenges:  
Inter & Intra- Government Relations, ICT 
 
Despite the government’s campaign to reduce crime, the crime rate 
merely saw a marginal decline and inter-institutional cooperation on 
integrated security failed to work properly because of the lack of 
instruments or tools for the administration to achieve results (result-
oriented administration) or the technology (platform) to analyze data 
and share information. Certain institutions also refused to share their 
work with others or cooperate with citizens. Worse, many government 
decisions made through presidential decrees and legislative changes 
were unilaterally notified to public servants, which caused many such 
officials to misinterpret the government’s actions.  
 
After the enactment of the Public Service Organic Law in 2010, 
conflict erupted after police officers misunderstood that their salaries 
would be cut. Tension finally came to a boil with a rebellion of police 
officers was met by Ecuador’s armed forces on September 30, 2010. 
Fortunately, the revolt was suppressed in a day by the armed forces and 
a group of police officers who opposed the protest (Carroll, 2010), but 
this incident showed that Ecuador had a long way to go to achieve 
integrated security. Both police officers and soldiers had misunderstood 
the law; it did not lower their salaries. For this reason, the homicide rate 
saw a slight change over this period.  
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2. Contextual Conditions  
 
As a country is growingly getting interconnected through 
globalization, threats to its people have emerged both at home and 
abroad, which not only affect public welfare but also the nation’s 
economic development and environment. For this reason, the 
government needs to focus on providing integrated security to ensure 
public safety.   
 
Integrated security can be achieved through cooperation of all 
relevant stakeholders including the central and local governments, 
public and private institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs), and 
the people.   
 
 
3. Tracing the Implementation Process 
 
3.1. Launch of “Results-oriented” Government  
 
Executive Decree No. 555 issued in November 2010 enabled the 
Government by Results Project8 by requiring all public institutions to 
focus on result-oriented activities. A major component of this project 
was the so-called Comprehensive Scorecard, which allowed the control, 
execution, and fulfillment of objectives and the central government to 
conduct planning and management at the national level.  
 
The National Police, as a single entity under the Ministry of the 
Interior, developed and used the David system, which allowed 
management and monitoring of each unit’s activities and development 
of preventive strategies based on analysis of data shareable in real time.  
                                            
8 Government by Results is the name of both a policy and a platform.  
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National Police executive Fausto Martinez Terán9 said, “From 2010, 
the National Police began to use diverse techniques through this new 
system, which overcame the difficulty of lack of consolidated 
information from each unit, and the Comprehensive Scorecard was 
reported manually every month. Under the new system, however, 
information could be delivered in real time, which enabled us to develop 
strategies in less time.” 
 
3.2. De-centralization: Social Security Services (2012-15) 
 
To ensure better service equally across the country, the National Plan 
of the Decentralization and De-concentration of the State was 
implemented to raise government access to citizens. The plan was based 
on three administrative units - zones, districts, and circuits. 10 This 
planning tool allowed all institutions to align their decentralization and 
de-concentration strategies with the geographical distribution of the 
central government (SEMPLADES, 2009). 
 
Following these new guidelines, police units in several circuits were 
built for the benefit of residents. Similarly, the Prosecutor’s General 
Office and SIS-ECU-911 also implemented de-concentration projects so 
that more people could access their services. The Prosecutor’s General 
Office installed more offices in districts and SIS-ECU-911 put its 
centers across zones for 100-percent coverage. Other public institutions 
followed suit. 
 
The SIS-ECU-911 project aimed at providing integrated security 
services at the national level, but this required the institution to undergo 
decentralization. As of 2017, SIS-ECU-911 had 15 centers (seven zonal, 
                                            
9 Interview with Fausto MarTinze Terán, Head of Operations Planning at National Police of 
Santo Domingo  
10 According to the National Plan for the Decentralization and De-concentration of the State, 
each zone comprises districts. A district that coincides with a canton is a basic unit for 
planning and public service provision. A circuit is the smallest unit that corresponds to a 
parish.   
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eight local, and one operations in Galapagos) across the country, 
benefiting nearly 16 million inhabitants in Ecuador’s 24 provinces (SIS-
ECU-911, 2015). 
 
3.3. Technological Development  
(Geoportal, 2010; SIS-ECU-911, 2011; David, 2014) 
 
Through advanced systems like Geoportal, SIS-ECU-911, and David, 
the government could detect areas with the highest crime rates and use 
hotspot analysis based on geo-referenced data.  
 
As a preventive measure, potential criminals could face arrest by the 
General State Prosecutor’s Office via Geoportal, the integrated system 
of SIS-ECU-911 with a video surveillance system in each hotspot. The 
National Police could do the same through its David system. All these 
systems enhanced the organizational capacity of these government 
bodies and enabled the use of coordinated preventive strategies as the 
databases of the organizations were interconnected to share information 
 
3.4. Cooperation with Community 
 
National Police executive Carlos Raza 11  said, “Through the 
successful decentralization policy of the government, police became 
distributed in each region of the country, and came to realize what 
problems people faced. The information collected from residents was 
sent to police information departments for geo-referenced analysis of 
crimes. Moreover, through cooperation with community leaders, police 
gained better access to residents.”12 For the same reason, the SIS-ECU-
911 reflected the opinions of an area’s residents on improving public 
safety when installing surveillance cameras.   
 
 
                                            
11 Interview with Juan Carlos Raza, Head of Operations Planning, National Police in Santo Domingo 
12 Interview with Fausto Lincango, Director of SIS-ECU-911 in Quito 
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3.5. SIS-ECU-911 (2011) 
 
Executive Decree No. 988 was issued on December 29, 2011, to 
launch integrated security service.  
 
3.5.1. Project Financing Capacity Building of Public Safety Staff 
 
The SIS-ECU-911 project required a huge investment because of the 
need for several centers with state-of-the-art technologies and modern 
facilities in key regions. This was to allow public servants from a 
variety of institutions to work together in the interest of providing better 
security services to the public. In late 2010, the government secured 
funding from the Development Bank of China, and the China National 
Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC) built the SIS-ECU-
911 centers.    
 
In addition, a delegation of representatives from Ecuador’s armed 
forces, National Police, National Secretariat for Risk Management, 
Ministry of Public Health and other government bodies visited China 
during the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008 to observe how China 
implemented its citizen security system. They learned the importance of 
integrated security and technical details of the system.  
 
The delegation also visited other world cities such as Madrid, Rio de 
Janeiro, and London and several U.S. states to learn how other countries 
run integrated security or emergency centers. These experiences enabled 
them to know about the processes for creating Ecuador’s integrated 
system and jointly coordinate relevant institutions.   
 
3.5.2. 7 Services Provided by ECU-911 Centers 
 
• Public Security Crimes such as robbery and assault directly related to 
the National Police and the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights, and 
Cults 
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• Health Management Health issues and relevant institutions handled 
by Ministry of Public Health, Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security 
(IESS), fire departments, Ecuadorian Red Cross and others  
• Transit and Mobility Metropolitan Transit Agency in charge of 
transportation in most populated cities such as Quito; National Police 
handles same service in areas with no decentralized traffic control  
• Claims Management Fire departments in charge of this work such as 
fire and rescue services  
• Risk Management National Secretariat for Risk Management in 
charge of handling natural disasters like earthquakes and landslides 
through de-centralized autonomous governments 
• Military Service Border control at national level carried out by armed 
forces, whose actions are coordinated with SIS-ECU-911 centers and 
receive helicopters if necessary 
• Municipal Services Four municipal companies - metropolitan police 
and metropolitan companies of electricity, public water, and 
cleanliness - cooperate with ECU-911 centers (SIS-ECU-911, 2015) 
 
By providing these seven services to the public, the SIS-ECU-911, as 
the main center for coordinating government activities to raise public 
safety. has helped lower the crime rate in Ecuador. 
 
▌Figure 5-2 ▌ Homicide Rate in Ecuador (2001-16) 
Source: The author made this graph based on data from the National Police of Ecuador 
(2001-12) and the Prosecutor’s General Office (2013-16). 
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4. Lessons Learned 
 
4.1. Strong Government and Presidential Interest in Public Security 
 
A stronger central government is needed to enact relevant laws and 
implement measures to improving public security. Creating the legal 
grounds for this is the first step toward launching reform because 
without a legal basis, getting all relevant institutions to work together is 
difficult. While enacting new laws or decrees, the government, like in 
this case, might face several difficulties such as strong opposition. Yet 
such obstacles can be overcome through meetings and negotiations. And 
the president, as the country’s most powerful official, must show strong 
interest in public safety in serving as a powerful force driving reform.  
 
4.2. Setup of Coordinating Institutions for Negotiations   
 
Ecuador set up several coordinating organizations including councils, 
commissions, and committees to allow relevant public institutions to jointly 
discuss a diversity of issues, including public safety. This is because when 
reform is carried out at the national level, one organization should coordinate 
the entire procedure. And because many government entities are involved in 
public security, they need a place to discuss and share information.     
 
4.3. Government by Results 
 
Public institutions should set objectives over the short, medium, and 
long term and implement, monitor, and evaluate them in cooperation 
with each other based on central government guidelines. Through an 
inter-connected platform, all public agencies can share information 
without delay.  
 
4.4. Building Staff Capacity via Training  
 
To properly implement the ECU911 Integrated Security Service, 
continuous training of staff in new technologies is needed, as well as 
 
CHAPTER 5 Development of Integrated Security for Public Safety in Ecuador    137 
cooperation with other public security institutions. Staff from the 
ECU911 centers received training from British police.  
 
4.5. Technological Development 
  
To secure the innovative technologies required for planning, 
implementing, monitoring, and evaluating actions, a new platform can 
be created through the assistance of bilateral and multilateral agencies. 
In Ecuador, the SIS-ECU-911 project received financial and technical 
aid from the Development Bank of China and Chinese corporations; the 
setup of the other platforms like the David system was financed by 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
 
 
5. Implications for Science of Delivery 
 
Crime remains a serious problem in many Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. A highly effective means to reduce crime is to 
enact a law banning the carrying of firearms as Ecuador did in 2009, but 
this is tough to do because of potential for strong opposition from 
interest groups like in the U.S. And in Latin America, where violent 
drug cartels are prevalent, governments might face even more 
difficulties. 
 
From this perspective, Ecuador’s development of integrated public 
security has many implications for other developing countries plagued 
with high levels of violence and crime. To properly implement an 
integrated security system, the government must take strong and 
decisive action based on the president’s strong leadership because the 
interests of public organizations are considerably entwined.   
 
As previously mentioned, building the legal basis for integral 
security is the first step toward enabling the participation of relevant 
institutions and technologies. A national platform is also required to 
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exchange information on integrated security, as well as heighten  
participation by the people to better understand the needs of the public.   
 
In addition, a council or committee is needed in which stakeholders 
share ideas and strategies based on the clear guidelines of those 
organizations. Finally, the formation of an inter-governmental agency in 
charge of integrated security activities is crucial at the implementation 
level. This would allow relevant organizations to cooperate for 
providing better public security, especially through preventive measures.  
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▌ Annexes ▌  
Annex A. Process Map 
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Annex B. Stakeholder Map 
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Annex C. List of Interviewees 
Organization Position Name 
Prosecutor- General‘s 
Office 
Planning management 
director  Fernando Heredia 
Prosecutor Fabián Salazar 
Criminal policy expert Alex Tupisa 
Ex-adviser of  
Prosecutor-General’s 
Office 
Ivan Del Pozo 
Ex-financial 
administrative director  José Guerra 
Ex-director of criminal 
policy  
Santiago Rene Aguello 
Mejia 
National Police in Santo 
Domingo 
Head of operations 
planning department   Fausto Martinez Teran 
National Police chief in 
Santo Domingo Juan Carlos Raza  
Head of information  
analysis department  Michael Balarezo 
Head of Dinased  Christian Paul Peralta 
Ministry of Justice, 
Human Rights, & Cults 
Minister (Social – 
Rehabilitation) Gustavo Penafiel 
Ex-adviser Ramiro Nunez Villacres 
Prosecutor’s School Ex-director  Teodoro Barros Austudillo 
ECU 911  
in Quito Director Fausto Lincango 
Council for Gender 
Equality President Consuelito Bowen 
Others Civilians (holding lawyer credentials) 
Sofia Granda,  
Dayana Castro, 
Nadia Nunez, 
Maria Castillo 
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